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ABSTRACT
On October 4th 1957, the Soviet Union launched the world’s first man-made satellite,
Sputnik 1, into an elliptical low Earth orbit. This surprise triggered an arms race between
the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as science-oriented educational reform in
the U.S. Sputnik sparked changes for the U.S. in military, politics, policies, and
education. The launch of Sputnik woke Americans up from complacency came from
technology, science, and educational superiority. Educational reform started with
emphasizing science and defense education and it was expanded to all levels of
education. Early reforms, the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the National
Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958 were focused on science and defense education
during Eisenhower’s administration. Domestic programs such as Civil Rights and Great
Society diffused educational policy to produce more general human capitals for improve
poverty and economic growth during the administrations of Kennedy and Johnson. The
Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965 was enacted to support postsecondary education. I
assert that these policy outputs have contributed to the dramatic increase in the supply of
college graduates since 1960. This study begins with emphasizing the Soviet launching of
Sputnik and educational reform in early 1960s in U.S. as a cause and effect relationship.
Analysis focuses on the policy process of educational reform by applying Kingdon’s
multiple streams model, and on the economic effects of increase in the supply of college
graduates by applying Acemoglu’s theory, the pooling and separating equilibria (1999).
According to Acemoglu, economy transitions from initial pooling equilibrium to
separating equilibrium as supply of high skilled labor increases and thus labor markets
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show different patterns in unemployment rates and wage structures for skilled and
unskilled, as well as job mismatch. I find that occupational segregation at the state labor
markets increases corresponding to supply of college graduates, and overeducation
decreases as occupational segregation increases. Moreover, occupational segregation has
positive wage effects and wage penalty from overeducation becomes smaller in states
where occupations are more separated between the skilled and the unskilled. College
graduates earn more wage premiums in states where occupations are more separated
between the skilled and the unskilled.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

This paper analyzes educational reform in the early 1960s in the United States, and
its economic consequences. This paper is consisted of two parts: the first part analyzes
policy process of educational reform in early 1960s in the U.S., and the second part
analyzes its economic consequences over time from 1960 to 2000. Instead of focusing on
a single specific policy, I focus on a policy event, which is the educational reform.
Sometimes reform movements in a society arise domestically, but sometimes they
happens by exogenous event. My observation is that the education reform in the early
1960s in America did not arise domestically but was triggered by an exogenous event,
which was the Soviet launch of Sputnik, on October 4, 1957. Therefore, I treat the launch
of Sputnik as a cause of the policy event.
According to the National Aeronautics and Space Act (NASA), Sputnik was the
world’s first artificial satellite and took about 98 minutes to orbit the Earth on its
elliptical path1. I begin this paper with the claim that there is a cause and effect
relationship between the Soviet launching of Sputnik and educational reform in the
United States. My observation is that there were immediate responses from the American
government such as: (1) U.S. Congress increased the National Science Foundation (NSF)
appropriation to $136 million for the 12 months beginning July 1, 1958 for existing NSF
educational programs and for the initiation of new ones. In 1960, the NSF’s appropriation

1

http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/

was $152.7 million and 2000 grants were made. (2) President Eisenhower signed the
National Defense Education Act (NDEA) into law in September 1958. The NDEA
poured $887 million over four years into programs intended to develop talented people in
America in fields related to national defense, and in 1965, Congress passed the Higher
Education Act (HEA) to assist postsecondary education.
The reason why I claim that Sputnik triggered educational reform in America
rather than other countries is that during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and America
(two superpowers) were in an arms race in developing the Inter Continental Ballistic
Missile (ICBM), nuclear weapons, and so on. Moreover, in 1955, America also had
established a project to launch its own satellite, which was called Vanguard. The Project
Vanguard was a program managed by the United States Naval Research Laboratory
(NRL), which intended to launch the first artificial satellite into Earth orbit using a
Vanguard rocket as the launch vehicle. Therefore, the two superpowers were not only in
arms race in missiles and nuclear weapons, but also in launching satellites, a competition
known as the space race2. In this competitive mood, the Soviet launch of Sputnik 1
brought a sudden change in the image of America, which had previously believed itself to
be the superior in education, science, technology, and military power in the world.

2

It is called the space race to distinguish from a formal arms race because its domain is the exterior of the
earth. In this paper, however, I consider the space race as an arms race in satellites such as arms race in
missiles or arms race in nuclear weapons, rather than separating space race from arms race as a different
concept.
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Figure 1. Wonder Why We are Not Keeping Pace?3

The American government perceived the Sputnik as more of a military threat to
national security than a simple product of science and technology. Although the average
Americans did not know much about any possible uses of a satellite, scientists,
politicians, and military personnel well knew about the potentiality of satellite
technology. Therefore, the American government could not consider the Sputnik as a
simple science and technology competition. Unfortunately, however, President
Eisenhower found that America was far behind the Soviet Union in basic science and in a
shortfall of scientists, especially space engineers. To have a space race with the Soviet
Union, America needed immense human capital in the science and space engineering
fields as soon as possible. Therefore, President Eisenhower, Congress, and the American
public began to recognize the need for educational investments in the U.S.

3

Source: Herblock, The Washington Post
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The second part of this paper is about the economic analysis of consequences of
educational reform. I observe that, since 1960, there has been an increase in college
enrollments. In 1940, less than one American adult in twenty (4.6 percent) was a college
graduate, but the number had quadrupled to one in five (19.4percent) in 1986 (Orfield,
1990). College enrollment was up 45 percent between 1970 and 1983 (Orfield, 1990). In
the beginning of the educational reform, the purpose of the NSF was educating science
elites. The purpose of the NDEA (1958) became a little bit broader focusing on science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics. Later, HEA (1965) was purposed to provide
financial support for general postsecondary education, and was reauthorized many times
up to 2013. Although NSF and NDEA (1958) produced science-related human capitals
intensively, with the perspective of higher education policy, I observe that sequential
education related policies have contributed to an increase in the supply of college
graduates in the labor market. Therefore, I argue that the consequences of the continuous
educational reforms is an increase in the supply of college graduates in the U.S. labor
market.
Some scholars argue that the wage rate of college graduates relative to the high
school graduates, called college wage premium, has been decreased due to an oversupply
of college graduates. For example, Freeman (1975) was the first observant of wage
depression for college graduates. He observed deterioration of economic position of
college graduates between 1969 and 1973, and claimed that there was over investments in
college education in the United States.
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Autor et al. (1998), however, found that widespread skill-biased technological
changes (SBTC) in the 1980s brought a huge demand for highly educated workers, as
well as a change in wage structure. He used usage of a computer as a proxy measurement
of SBTC and asserted that computer-led industrialization increased demands for skilled
labor and highly educated workers. Therefore, he claimed that over time, relative wages
of college graduates to high school graduates has been increased.
Acemoglu (1999) uses pooling and separating equilibria to explain wage
inequality in 1980s U.S. According to him, when skilled workers are few in the labor
market and productivity gap is small between skilled and unskilled, firms create middling
jobs for both skilled and unskilled workers because creating jobs separately for skilled
and unskilled is not profitable. When skilled workers are abundant in the labor market,
firms create jobs separately for the skilled and the unskilled. By this theory, the economy
transforms from the pooling equilibrium to the separating equilibrium. In separating
equilibrium, wages for skilled workers are much higher but wages for unskilled workers
are much lower than in the pooling equilibrium. Unemployment rates become higher for
both the skilled and the unskilled because firms increase job screening to find better
matched workers, but job mismatch becomes lower.

5

Table 1. Years of Overeducation and Incidence of Mismatch
Years of Overeducation for Total
Mean

Variance

Incidence of Mismatch for College Graduates (%)

Obs.

Required

Over

Under

Obs.

1960

0.58

1.36

166301

30.40

62.27

7.33

10056

1970

0.53

1.30

182258

27.86

68.67

3.47

11552

1980

0.78

1.47

1067092

28.43

68.33

3.24

116681

1990

0.62

1.18

1370669

54.04

42.94

3.02

216396

2000

0.59

1.13

1583545

62.68

34.66

2.66

288056

Table 1 shows years of overeducation for the total sample and the incidence of
mismatch for college graduates, respectively.4 Years of overeducation is measured based
on the Duncan-Hoffman mismatch measurement, which is actual education minus mode
years of education in each occupation.5 Years of overeducation measures how many
years of education are surplus over the education that the occupation requires. The left
hand side of the table reveals that, since 1980, the mean value of years of overeducation
has decreased and variance has been smaller. The right hand side of the table is made
based on mismatch dummy variables. For example, required education is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the worker’s educational attainment is equal to the mode year of
education in each occupation. Overeducation is equal to 1 if his or her education is more
than mode year of education, and undereducation is equal to 1 if his or her education is
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Generally, economic concern of job mismatch is on overeducation because overeducated workers earn less
than their marginal product, and overeducation is the challenge for mainly college graduates than high school
graduates.
5
Methodology is explained in the literature review.
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less than mode year of education. It shows that, since 1970, the percentage of college
graduates categorized to required education has been increased, and overeducation has
been decreased.
In this paper, I examine the economic effects of the increase in supply of college
graduates by applying Acemoglu’s theory, the pooling and separating equilibria, in three
aspects: wage effects of industry-occupational segregation, job mismatch, and college
wage premium. I differentiate this paper from previous literatures in two ways. First, with
applying Acemoglu’s theory, I focus on the event of educational reform in America and
thereby I link educational reform and increase in the supply of college graduates.
Therefore, in this paper, supply of college graduates is not an exogenous variable.
Second, with regard to job mismatch, previous literature has not considered the transition
of the economy. Applying Acemoglu’s theory, I measure wage effects of mismatch in the
relation with transition of economy from the pooling equilibrium to the separating
equilibrium. In other words, the magnitudes of wage penalty related with overeducation
may be different in the pooling equilibrium and in the separating equilibrium as wages
for skilled worker are expected to be different from different equilibria.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews previous literature about
changes in wage structure in America and job mismatch. In Chapter 3, I propose three
arms race models to explain the relationship between Sputnik and educational reform. By
applying Kingdon’s multiple streams I try to understand the policy process of policy
outputs in the beginning of the educational reform. In Chapter 4, I review the government
financial aid for education with different views. In Chapter 5, I describe policy outputs

7

such as National Science Foundation (NSF), National Defense Educational Act of 1958,
and Higher Education Act of 1965, and trend of college enrollments as policy effects.
Chapter 6 reports results of the empirical study, and summary and conclusion remarks are
in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Change in Wage Structure

Slonimczyk (2013) shows that skill mismatch was a significant source of
inequality in real earnings in the U.S. during 1973-2002. He uses the Duncan-Hoffman
mismatch measure. His inequality measurements are the variance of log earnings, the
Gini coefficient, and percentile gaps of earnings by using General Education
Development (GED), Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) to measure required
education, and using data from CPS 1973 to 2002. Over-education rates for males and
females were around 15% in 1973 and increasing constantly throughout the period to
reach levels of around 35% of the employed labor force, while under-education follows a
downward trend. Surplus and deficit qualifications taken together account for 4.3% and
4.6% of the variance of log earnings (around 15% of the total explained variance in 2002)
for males and females, respectively.
Katz and Murphy (1992) investigated changes in relative wages from 1963 to
1987 by using a supply and demand framework. They were concerned with explaining
relative wage changes as a function of relative supply and relative factor demand shifts.
They found that changes in the wage structure were derived from a growth in the demand
for high educated and more skilled workers, and the college premium was strongly
related with supply of college graduates using data from March CPS, 1964 to 1988.

9

Figure 2. College/High School Wage Ratio

1-5 years of experience
All experience
levels

Figure 2 comes from their paper6, which shows that the college wage premium for those
who have 1-5 years of experience and all experience levels, respectively. The wage ratio
rose from 1963 to 1971, fell from 1971 to 1979, and then rose sharply from 1979 to 1987,
consistent with the largest increase in the supply of college graduates during the 1971 to
1979, and the smallest growth of supply during the 1979 to 1987. Moreover, they found
that the changes in the college/high school wage ratio were greatest for the youngest
workers in the 1970s and 1980s and greatest for prime age workers in the 1960s.
Acemoglu (1999) explains wage inequality in 1980’s U.S. by qualitative change
in the composition of jobs, which was derived from the increase in the proportion of
skilled workers or skill-biased technological change (SBTC). He observed wage
differentials between college graduates and high school graduates, and among college
graduates themselves in 1980s. He claims that increase in the supply of skills can create

Katz, F. Lawrence, Kevin M. Murphy, “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand
Factors”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 1. (Feb., 1992), pp. 35-78.
6
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more than its own demand and increase inequality. He provides a theory for wage
differentials between different skill groups and within skill groups by using job mismatch
and transition of labor market equilibrium, in which economy has a pooling equilibrium
and a separating equilibrium.
According to Acemoglu, in a pooling equilibrium, profit-maximizing firms create
middling jobs for both skilled and unskilled workers when the supply of skills is limited
and the productivity gap is small between skilled and unskilled workers. Because in a
pooling equilibrium both skilled and unskilled workers are employed in the same jobs,
unskilled workers are employed at higher physical to human capital ratios than the skilled
workers, and thus wage differentials are compressed. In a separating equilibrium, firms
create separate jobs for skilled and unskilled workers. Therefore, in a separating
equilibrium, skilled workers earn more and the unskilled earn less than in a pooling
equilibrium. His theory says that labor market transits from a pooling equilibrium to a
separating equilibrium as the supply of skilled workers increases or skilled-biased
technological change increases the demand for skilled workers. As a result, qualitative
change in the composition of jobs reduces unskilled wages, raises skilled wages and
raises unemployment rates for both groups. He provides some evidence for a shifting of
labor market from a pooling to a separating equilibrium between 1970s and the 1990s by
using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1976, 1978, and 1985) and Current Population
Survey (ORG 1983, 1993).

11

2. Theory about Existence of Overeducation

Typically, job mismatch is defined as educational mismatch between educational
attainment an occupation requires to do the work and educational attainment that workers
acquired. There are several theoretical explanations about the existence of overeducation
in the labor market.
According to Spence’s (1973) job-screening model, the labor market is
characterized by imperfect information, and education is used as a signal to identify
more able and motivated individuals or more productive ones to employers. In the
job-screening model, education does not relate directly to productivity, while human
capital theory says that education improves productivity and impacts returns to schooling.
In order to acquire more of the signal, individuals will invest more in education,
hoping that an additional amount of educational signal suffices to distinguish them
from others. Therefore, there is a tendency to get more years of education than is
required for jobs. The private rate of return from educational investment can stay high
and provide continuing incentives for investment in education.
The job-competition model of Thurow (1975) considers two queues: a job queue
and a person queue. Each job in the job queue has its own skill requirements, productivity
characteristics and pay scale. Individuals competing for jobs also form a queue, their
relative position in the queue being determined by a set of characteristics such as
education and experience that suggest to employers the cost of training them in the skills
necessary to perform a given job. The higher a person is in the person queue, the less is
the cost of training and the more likely the person will be to get a job at the head of the

12

job queue. Thus, in order to place themselves higher up in the person queue, individuals
will invest in education hoping that an additional amount of education will enhance their
chance of getting a good job relative to others. Therefore, wages are determined by
demand side. Education is heavily subsidized by the government so that the private cost
of education is reduced. Individuals would be expected to consider only their private
costs instead of the true social costs in making decisions regarding educational
investment. According to the job screening theory and job competition theory,
overeducation is rather a persistent phenomenon.

3. Overeducation: permanent or transitory?

There has been an argument whether overeducation is a transitory phenomenon in
one’s job career or a persistent phenomenon. Jovanovic (1979) constructed a model of
permanent job separations, in which a job match is treated as a pure experience good. In
his theory, workers find a better match as their experiences in the labor market grows.
Therefore, inexperienced or young workers are more likely to be in a mismatch.
According to Jovanovic, overeducation is a short-run phenomenon.
Sicherman and Galor (1990) analyzed the significance of occupational mobility in
individuals’ labor market career and explain the part of returns to schooling by
occupational upgrading. They used data from Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
1976-81. Schooling has a positive effect on career mobility within and across firms. More
educated workers are more likely to quit than to be laid off.
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Hersch (1991) analyzed the relationship between overeducation and job
satisfaction. He found that overqualified workers are less satisfied with their jobs and are
more likely to quit.
Sicherman Nachum (1991) examined the reasons for overeducation and returns to
schooling in the human capital mobility framework. He hypothesized that a trade-off
exists between schooling and other components of human capital. Mismatch is a
temporary phenomenon in the career mobility theory. He used data from Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) 1976-77 and 1978-79. Around 40% of the workers report
themselves as overeducated and 16% as undereducated. Overeducated workers have low
mean years of market experience, while undereducated workers are much more
experienced. Overeducated workers have less on-the-job training, while undereducated
workers report more on-the-job training. Overeducated workers are more likely to change
firms, while the undereducated stay much longer in the same firm. Overeducated workers
are more likely to move to a higher-level occupation and undereducated workers have a
lower probability of upward mobility.
Alba-Ramirez (1993) examined overeducation in the Spanish labor market. He
found that overeducated workers have less experience, decreased on-the-job training and
higher turnover than other comparable workers. He used data from The Living and
Working Conditions Survey (ECVT), a Spanish nation-wide representative household
survey of 1985. In the ECVT survey, 17% workers reported themselves as overeducated
and 23% workers reported as undereducated. Overeducated workers earned more than the
adequately educated, while undereducated workers earned less than adequately educated.
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Unobserved heterogeneity and compensating differentials could be important. A logit
estimation indicated that overeducated workers have a higher turnover rate. Male, more
educated, as well as more experienced workers, have a higher probability of improving
their match as they move from one job to another.
Sousa-Poza and Frei (2012) examined whether overqualification is permanent or
transitory in Switzerland by using panel data from Swiss Household Panel for 1999 to
2006. Constant accumulation of experience and qualifications throughout a worker’s
career help escape from overqualification. While in early life overqualification rises and
reaches its peak between 25 and 35 years of age, it declines in advancing years. They
found that overqualification is short-lived for individuals. More than 60% of the workers
who become overqualified in a given year escape overqualification the following year;
about 80% have escaped overqualification after two years and close to 90% after four
years.

4. Measurement of Required Education

There are three methods of measuring required education: objective measure (job
analysis), subjective measure (self-assessment), and statistical measure (realized
matches). First, job analysis measures required schooling levels based on information
contained in occupational classifications. A well-known example is the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles, which contains indicators for educational requirements in the form
of the General Educational Development (GED) scale. This scale runs from 1 to 7. These
GED categories are then translated into school years equivalents (0 to 18). Second, self-
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assessment measures are based on workers’ responses to rely on questions that ask
workers about the schooling requirements of their job. In most survey data, respondents
subjectively answer to the survey question whether they consider themselves to have the
required educated or not for the job they are doing. Third, realized matches compare
workers’ educational level in the occupation by using a statistical mean or modal value of
the distribution. Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) defined required education as one standard
deviation plus/minus mean value of education in each occupation. Kiker et al. (1997)
uses mode value of years of education in each occupation for the required education.

5. Empirical Specifications for Mismatch

There are two popular empirical specifications used to assess the wage effect of
overeducation. They are derived from the standard Mincer (1974) model, in which
earnings are a function of schooling and experience as follows:
𝐿𝑛 (𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒) = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 2 + 𝜀𝑖
where Ln Wage represents log wages, and Education represents educational attainment.
In this specification, it is assumed that workers are fully utilized and paid according to
their marginal productivity. Therefore, there is no overeducation.
However, the following two models incorporate factor underutilization in the
wage function. If workers are classified as overeducated, they are considered to not fully
utilize their human capital in their job; the portion of extra years of education become
idle and is not rewarded well. In other words, overeducated workers are paid below than
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their marginal productivity, while workers are paid based on marginal productivity in
neoclassical economics.
The first mismatch model is the Verdugo and Verdugo model (1989),
𝐿𝑛 (𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒) = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖
where Ln Wage represents log wages, Education represents years of schooling completed
and Overeducation (Undereducation) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual is
categorized as overeducated (undereducatied) category. In this model, mismatched
workers are compared to workers with the same level of schooling who hold adequately
matched jobs. If wages are determined by only actual educational attainment, beta 2 and
beta 3 are expected to be zero. If wages are determined by the required level of education,
years of schooling exceeding the required amount would be unproductive and the reward
for these additional years would be zero. In this case, an overeducated worker would earn
less than those who have the required education and beta 2 would be negative, while beta
3 would be positive. Most studies have found that overeducated workers receive
significant pay penalties (𝛽2<0) and undereducated workers receive substantial wage
premiums (𝛽3>0) (Verdugo & Verdugo, 1989; Sicherman, 1991; Bauer, 2002).
The second mismatch model is the Duncan and Hoffman (1984) model that
decomposes actual years of schooling (EDU) into required years of schooling (EDUr),
years of overschooling (EDUo), and years of underschooling (EDUu).
𝐿𝑛 (𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒) = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑟 + 𝛽2 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑜 + 𝛽3 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑢 + 𝜀𝑖
𝐸𝐷𝑈 = 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑟 + 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑜 − 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑢
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑜 = 𝐸𝐷𝑈 − 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑟 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝐷𝑈 > 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑟 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 0
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𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑢 = 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑟 − 𝐸𝐷𝑈 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝐷𝑈 < 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑟 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 0
In this model, beta 1 is the return to years of required schooling (required education), beta
2 is the return to an additional year of schooling beyond those required (overeducation),
and beta 3 is the return to a year of schooling below the schooling requirement
(undereducation). Most studies have found that the extra years of schooling have a
positive wage effect but smaller than the return to years of required schooling (𝛽1 >
𝛽2>0), while return to years of underschooling is negative (𝛽3<0). Compare to the
Verdugo and Verdugo model, beta 1 and beta 2 must be interpreted relative to workers in
the same occupation who are correctly matched. Human capital theory implies equal
returns 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = −𝛽3. Job competition theory is a demand-side theory, where marginal
productivity is taken as a fixed characteristic of a particular job and is not related to the
worker. It implies zero returns to years of over and under education, 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 0
(Duncan & Hoffman, 1981; Rumberger, 1987; Sicherman, 1991)

6. Job Mismatch and Productivity

Tsang and Levin (1985) questioned the relationship between overeducation and
productivity. Based on industrial psychology literature, they claimed that overeducated
workers are more likely to be dissatisfied with their jobs and exhibit counterproductive
behavior in the workplace.
Tsang (1987) examined the impact of the underutilization of workers’ educational
skills on the production of output of a firm based on the Tsang-Levin model of
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production. He used the employees of 22 U.S. Bell companies over 1981 to 1983. His
three-step approach showed a negative impact of overeducation on firm productivity.
Ramos et al., (2009) examined impacts of overeducation on the regional
economic growth in 229 European regions in nine countries by using IPUMS
International for 1995, 2000, 2005. They used both cross-sectional and panel regression.
They found that both the percentage of properly educated workers and the percentage of
over-educated workers have positive and statistically significant impacts on per capita
GDP growth. Especially, the magnitude of the coefficient for the percentage of overeducated workers is greater than the coefficient for the percentage of properly educated
workers. The results reveal that at the regional level as an aggregation, overeducation
might be seen more as an investment than as a cost, although overeducated individuals
obtain a smaller wage than individuals who have required education. In other words, they
insist that the economic impact of overeducation is different between the individual level
and the aggregation level.

7. Quintile Regression

Hartog et al, (2001) examined the evolution of the returns to education in Portugal
over the 1980s and early 1990s. Quintile regression analysis reveals that the effect of
education is not constant across the conditional wage distribution. They are higher for
those at higher quintiles in the conditional wage distribution. Education affects wages
differently at different parts of the distribution. The return to a year of education required
and the return to a year of education above the job requirement increase as one moves
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upwards in the conditional wage distribution. The penalty for a year of education below
that required for the job also tends to increase at higher quintiles, but at a much slower
pace.
McGuinness and Doyle (2004) examined the impacts of overeducation on income
quantiles for a cohort of Northern Ireland graduates. They used a dummy variable for
overeducation and found that the related wage penalty was heavily concentrated on the
lower income quintiles. Especially, overeducation was more predominant amongst lower
ability male graduates.

8. Unobserved heterogeneity

The majority of studies have assumed that mismatch is exogenous and used crosssectional data that cannot account for unobserved heterogeneity. Robst (1995) examined
the relationship between college quality and overeducation by using Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) data for 1976 and 1985. He found a negative relationship
between college quality and the likelihood of being overeducated, and college quality
influences the ability of overeducated workers to exit the classification. College quality is
measured by ACT scores, SAT scores, the amount of education and general expenditure
per student, and a prestige rating developed by Richard Coleman. Those with higher test
scores face a lower likelihood of being overeducated. For the average ACT score, 44% of
the lowest quartile were overeducated in both periods. Of the workers who were
overeducated in 1976, individuals from higher quality colleges were more likely to leave
the classification by 1985. Workers who attended higher quality colleges are found to
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have a lower probability of being overeducated. There is a negative relationship between
college quality and the probability of being overeducated and a positive relationship
between college quality and the probability of leaving overeducation status.
Bauer (2002) examined the wage effects of educational mismatch by using a
German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) data set with controlling unobserved
heterogeneity. He found that the estimated differences between adequately and
inadequately educated workers become smaller or disappear totally after controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity. A potential problem of the existing studies, however, lies in
the data sets that they have used, since most employ only cross-sectional data. It is
possible that the estimation results of these studies are biased due to unobserved
heterogeneity of individuals. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity might be
important if the probability of educational mismatch is correlated with innate ability.
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity might be important if individuals with lower
innate ability need more education to attain a job for which they are formally
overeducated.
Bauer compared results from three different specifications: V-V model, pooled
OLS, Random effects, and Fixed effects. He used two measurements for mismatch: mean
plus/minus one standard deviation and modal value. The results for the pooled OLS
suggest that overeducated male workers earn 10.6% less and undereducated male workers
8% more than male workers with the same amount of education who are working in
occupations which fully utilize their educational level. For both the random effects and
the fixed effects model, the estimated coefficients of the educational mismatch dummies
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change in the expected direction. In most cases, the absolute values of the estimated
coefficients on the dummies indicating educational mismatch are significantly lower
when unobserved characteristics are accounted for. The estimated effects change
dramatically when one controls for unobserved heterogeneity using panel estimation
techniques. The earnings differences between inadequately educated workers and equally
educated workers who work in occupations for which they are adequately educated
becomes at least smaller, and in most cases disappears totally.
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CHAPTER THREE
HYPOTHETICAL FRAMEWORK

Figure 3. Hypothetical Framework
< Exogenous Event >

< Arms Race >

< Policy Event >

Soviet Launch of
Sputnik

U.S.S.R. vs.
U.S.

Educational
Reform in U.S.

< Policy Process>
Problems Stream

1. Expanding role of the NSF

Policy Stream

2. National Defense Education

Politics Stream

<Domestic Program>
Civil Rights
Great Society

< Policy Output>
3. Higher Education Act
(HEA) of 1965

< Policy Outputs >

Act (NDEA) of 1958

< Policy Effect >

< Labor Market >

< Economic Issues >

Increase in College
Enrollments

Increase in Supply
of Skilled Labor

1. Occupational Segregation
between skilled and
unskilled workers.
2. Job Mismatch.

<Exogenous Changes in Market>

< Labor Market >

Skill-Biased Technological Change.

Increase in Demand

International Trade.

for Skilled Labor
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3. College Wage Premium.

Figure 3 shows the hypothetical framework for this paper; the arrows imply
possible causality flow. I claim that there is a cause and effect relationship between
Sputnik and educational reform in U.S. in early 1960s. By introducing a Sputnik into the
educational reform in U.S., I argue that educational reform in U.S. did not arise based on
domestic needs but it was triggered by an exogenous event. First, I use the Arms Race
Model to support the linkage between Sputnik and educational reform in U.S. Second, I
use John Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model to explain the policy process of producing
policy outputs related with science and defense. Third, the initial purpose of federal
funding was diffused to producing more general human capitals for economic growth
under the subsequent domestic programs such as Civil Rights and Great Society. Fourth,
I focus on three policy outputs related with higher education: NSF, NDEA (1958), and
HEA (1965). Fifth, I interpret the increase in the supply of college graduates as a policy
outcome, combining the NSF, NDEA, and HEA. Sixth, there are three economic issues
that I analyze with an empirical study: occupational segregation between skilled and
unskilled workers, overeducation, and college wage premium.

1. Arms Race Model
Arms Race Model provides theoretical perspectives about the reaction of the
American government reflecting the rivalry relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union during the Cold War. In other words, the American government perceived Sputnik
as more a military threat than a simple scientific and technological achievement. They
thought that if a country is able to govern space, it will be able to dominate over the
world. Therefore, I interpret the reaction of the American government as an extension of
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the arms race, instead of merely a science educational competition. The following three
arms race models provide a single dominant strategy for American government against
the Soviet launching of Sputnik.
1-1. Richardson’s arms race model
According to the Richardson’s (1960) arms race model between two countries, the
rate of change in a country’s level of armaments is negative to its own level of
armaments, but positive to its enemy’s level of armaments. It is mathematically expressed
by a set of linear differential equations. For example, let’s say the two countries are U.S.
and the Soviet Union. The equations would be as follows:
𝑑(𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎)
= 𝑎 − 𝑏(𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎) + 𝑐(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑠)
𝑑𝑡
𝑑(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑠)
= 𝑑 − 𝑒(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 𝑓(𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎)
𝑑𝑡
The coefficients 𝑎 and 𝑑 are “grievances” which derive nations to arm at a constant rate,
and coefficients 𝑏 and 𝑒 are “fatigue and expense” caused by economic burden, and 𝑐 and
𝑓 are called “defense coefficients” which measure each nation’s reaction to its
opponent’s armaments. Thus, the equations tell us that change in America’s armaments
positively relates with the level of Soviet’s armaments and vice versa.
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Figure 4. Military Expenditure Reaction Functions
America
E3

E2

E1

Soviet Union
Union
It does not mean that there is no equilibrium. Figure 4 shows the military expenditure
response functions for the Soviet Union and America. In the above equations, A
represents America and S represents the Soviet Union. Let’s say that the initial
equilibrium is E1. Considering the arms race, if the Soviet Union increases its military
expenditure, the new equilibrium will be E2, which triggers America’s response, and the
correspondingly increase in military expenditure by America raises the new equilibrium
level of expenditure to E3. Therefore, America’s best reaction is increased military
expenditure corresponding to the Soviets’. However, why does either of the countries try
to break the equilibrium? The following Prisoner’s Dilemma Game gives an answer.
1-2. The Arms Race as a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Brams et al. (1979) modeled a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game for the arms race by
with which they explained why one side broke the equilibrium.
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Table 2. The Arms Race as a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
USSR
Disarm

Arm

USSR: 0

USSR: 45

Disarm
US: 0

US: -30

US
USSR: -30

USSR: -5

Arm
US: -5

US: 45

Table 2 shows a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game for an arms race between two countries,
America and Soviet Union. The numbers in each box are payoffs for the strategy for each
country. According to the payoff, the dilemma in this game is that Arm is the dominant
strategy for both countries. In other words, regardless of the other country’s strategy,
each country obtains a higher payoff by choosing Arm, which means that America’s best
strategy does not depend on whatever the Soviet Union chooses. If both countries choose
Disarm, then payoff is (US: 0, USSR: 0), but there cannot be an equilibrium because each
country has an incentive to choose Arm and thus obtain its highest payoff (US: 45 or
USSR: 45) and imposes the worst payoff on the other player (USSR: -30 or US: -30).
Therefore, choosing Arm, (US: -5, USSR: -5), is the unique equilibrium.

1-3. Competitive Arms Accumulation Model

Ploeg and Zeeuw (1990) show a competitive arms accumulation model
between two countries in the form of utilities, which depend on consumption, leisure and
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the characteristic defense. In their model, government finances the investment in arms by
non-distortionary taxation and representative household maximizes utility and firm
maximizes profits.
Government’s budget constraint: ɡ = τ
ɡ: government investment, τ: lump-sum taxes
Household maximizes utility: 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙, 𝑑) subject to budget constraint 𝑜 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑤𝑙 + 𝜋 − 𝜏
𝑐: 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑙: 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, d: defense, w: real wage, π: profits, τ: lump-sum
taxes.
Firm maximizes profit: 𝜋 = 𝑓(𝑙) − 𝑤𝑙
𝑓: 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑤 = 𝑓 , (𝑙)
Goods market equilibrium: 𝑓(𝑙) = 𝑐 + 𝑔
In the model, utility is assumed to be separable in defense, which is a function of a
country’s own weapon stock and foreign weapon stock, that is d=D (a, a*), where ‘a’
denotes own weapon stock and ‘a*’ denotes foreign weapon stock. It is assumed that
defense is an increasing function of one’s own weapon stock, a, 𝑑𝐷⁄𝑑𝑎 > 0, while it is a
decreasing function of the foreign weapon stock, a*, 𝑑𝐷⁄𝑑𝑎∗ < 0. Moreover, equal
increase in the weapon stocks of two countries leaves the level of defense unaffected,
which is 𝑑𝐷⁄𝑑𝑎 = − 𝑑𝐷⁄𝑑𝑎∗ > 0. If we assume that the two countries are America and
the Soviet Union, ‘a’ represents the level of armaments of U.S. and ‘a*’ represents the
level of armaments of the Soviet Union. Therefore, for the representative household in
the U.S., utility from defense is increased by the level of armaments of the U.S. but
decreased by increasing the level of armaments of the Soviet Union. To satisfy

28

equilibrium condition, 𝑑𝐷⁄𝑑𝑎 = − 𝑑𝐷⁄𝑑𝑎∗ , the American government should increase
the level of armaments, as well as tax collections.
In summary, Richardson’s linear differential equations for the arms race model
are inversely related to a country’s own weapon stocks because of economic burden, but
positively related to the competing country’s weapon stock because of the threat. Brams’
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game for the arms race shows that a country can obtain the highest
payoff by arming, regardless of the competitive country’s strategy. Ploeg and Zeeuw’s
competitive arms accumulation model tells us that increase in the weapon stocks of the
competitive country causes disutility of the representative household in the home country.
Equilibrium is achieved when the level of weapon stocks are equal in both countries.
Therefore, the responses of the American government, which are educational reform and
expanding government expenditure for armaments, are justified by these three arms race
models.
2. Agenda Setting by Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model
Kingdon’s multiple streams model is a popular theoretical perspective used to
explain the dynamic and complex agenda-setting process. Kingdon’s Multiple Streams
Policy Making is based on three independent process streams: problems, policies, and
politics. When any two streams are coupled, they change a circumstance and enhance the
probability of an issue being on the government’s decision agenda (Young et al. 2010).
Sometimes the policy window is opened by a problem that presses in on government, or
at least comes to be regarded as pressing (Kingdon, 2013). According to Kingdon, the
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problem stream explains why some problems come to occupy the attention of
government officials. The problem stream involves the process of problem recognition by
indicators, focusing events, and feedback. Indicators are used to assess the magnitude of
the condition, a focusing event draws attention to some conditions more than to others,
and officials learn about conditions through feedback about the operation of existing
programs. Conditions come to be defined as problems, and have a better chance of rising
on the agenda, when we come to believe that we should do something to change them.
The political streams model explains the relative prominence of issues on official
agenda. Independently of problem recognition, political events flow along according to
their own dynamics and their own rules. Participants perceive a swing in national mood,
elections bring new administrations to power and new partisan or ideological
distributions to Congress, and interest groups of various descriptions press their demands
on government. Policy stream addresses alternative specifications by members of the
policy community. Policy communities include policy actors inside and outside of the
government. I want to explain the educational agenda setting in the U.S. inspired by
Soviet launching of Sputnik by applying Multiple Streams Model.

2-1. Problem Stream

Problem stream focuses on the exogenous events of the sequential success of
launching Sputnik 1, Sputnik 2, and Sputnik 3, and its impact on American society and
corresponding problem recognition by Americans. Soviet Union launched world’s first
man-made artificial Earth satellite, Sputnik 1, on October 4, 1957. The American public,
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politicians, and military associates were surprised because the launching of a satellite was
a technological, scientific, and military achievement. Moreover, the success of Sputnik 1
seemed to have changed minds around the world regarding a shift in technological
leadership and military power to the Soviet Union from the United States.
When Americans witnessed the great success of Soviet space technology with the
launching of Sputnik in 1957, they stood in fear of the new aspect of the Soviet threat
(Lucena 2005, p.27). Some sectors of industry and the public responded by incorporating
the new objects of fear into consumer goods. Restaurants began serving
“Sputnikburgers,” and bars sold “Sputnik cocktails” (Lucena 2005, p.27). When
Americans get worried, their fear quickly spreads to the stock market. On October 7, the
Dow Jones index declined 6.32 points and two weeks later the market experienced its
largest one-day loss in two years (Degroot 2006, p.63). A month after the launch, opinion
polls showed that a majority of Americans considered Sputnik a blow to their nation’s
prestige, and a roughly equal percentage believed that the United States was behind the
Soviets in space research, with a significant number believing the gap “dangerously”
large (Degroot 2006, p. 67-68).
In a field-by-field survey of all Russian sciences, scientific experts from all over
the world agreed that, although the USSR lagged in some fields of applied science, it led
the U.S. in most fields of basic scientific research. “What is important about the Russian
satellites is the base of science beneath them,” (Lucena 2005, p.29). Scientific academics
(Vannevar Bush, James Conant, and James Killian) defined the new problem facing the
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American nation not only in terms of basic science and scientists but also in terms of
science education (Lucena 2005, p.30).
A group of scientists, James Conant (Chairman of the National Science Board),
Nicholas DeWitt (the NSF commission), and Alan Waterman (Director of NSF) criticized
the U.S. for producing too many businessman, lawyers, and humanities scholars and not
enough scientists and engineers (Lucena 2005, p.22). A couple of months after Sputnik,
Eisenhower made an official statement that national security is for the most critical
problem of all for the American people and asserted that the United States needed
thousands more scientists than were currently active (Lucena 2005, p.30). After Sputnik
went up, all the talk was about the “fact” that Russian kids went to school for six hours a
day, six days a week, and got shorter summer holidays than American children (Degroot
2006, p.76). An official report by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare made
the preposterous claim that all Russian children took five years of physics, four of
chemistry, and five of mathematics (Degroot 2006, p.76).
On November 3, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 2, a satellite weighing
about 500 kilos, about the size of small car. Even more remarkable than the weight was
the fact that the capsule contained a dog named Laika, and the systems necessary to keep
it alive for a short time (Degroot 2006, p.80). Once Laika went into orbit, Soviet and
American perceptions of space changed radically. Up until that point, the important issue
was the Soviet ability to lift very heavy objects into orbit. That capability seemed to
threaten U.S. security (Degroot 2006, p.81).
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On December 6, 1957, the United States made its first attempt to place a satellite
in orbit. The Vanguard team had a relatively new rocket that had not been fully tested
(Degroot 2006, p.82). At 11:44:55 AM on Friday, December 6, 1957, the slender rocket
rose slowly from its launch pad. After two seconds, and at an elevation of about four feet,
it abandoned the struggle. It shuddered, then collapsed in a fiery heap. The American
satellite was nicknamed Stayputnik, Flopnik, Oopsnik, Pfftnik, and Sputternik (Degroot
2006, p.83). Sputnik 2 continued to broadcast its signal until early December, thus
pouring salt on American wounds (Degroot 2006, p.84). The president was identified
with Vanguard’s failure and therefore had to share its ignominy (Degroot 2006, p.87).
Eisenhower’s space woes were compounded by talk of a missile gap. On
November 12, 1957, in the wake of Sputnik, a national intelligence estimate forecast that
the Soviets would have five hundred operational ICBMs by the end of 1962, while the
United States would have only around sixty-five. On the strength of this evidence,
Eisenhower was lambasted for endangering the security of the United States, even though
the American lead in bombers and total nuclear weapons was still huge (Degroot 2006,
p.91).
For most Americans, the “missile gap” and the space race were two sides of the
same coin. The public was growing increasingly impatient with Eisenhower’s
leadership—or lack thereof. They demanded action, especially after the success of
Explorer 1 was followed quickly by the embarrassing failure of a second Vanguard, and
then by the crash of Explorer 2 (Degroot 2006, 92).
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On May 15, 1958, the Soviets again emphasized their supremacy in heavy lifting
by launching Sputnik 3, a behemoth weighing nearly 1,400 kilos. The new capsule, one
Russian scientist stressed, “could easily carry a man with a stock of food and
supplementary equipment.” (Degroot 2006, 94).
In the problem stream, Americans started to recognize that they needed to address
three specific deficits: (1) the numbers of scientists, (2) science education and curriculum,
and (3) a lack of science education from K-12 to college, as well as further basic
scientific researches in higher education. Prior to 1957, the problem was defined as a
matter of numbers in the armed forces (Lucena 2005, p.31). With a more accurate
recognition of the problems facing the United States and its space program, scientists, the
White House, and Congress started to find policies to solve these specific problems.

2-2. Policy Stream

The American government recognized that the Soviet Union was far ahead of
America in basic scientific research. Immediately after Sputnik, one of the first requests
by both Congress and the President was to find out the number of scientists and engineers
available to meet the needs of the nation (Lucena 2005, p.46).
The popular media had better success in shifting the national attention from the
shortfall in numbers to science education (Lucena 2005, p.30). In early 1958, Life
magazine ran a five-part series on the “Crisis in Education” that explored every aspect of
“the field of battle for future brain power-the U.S. and the Russian schools.” (Lucena
2005, p.30). The series of articles concluded with James Conant’s blueprint for high
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school curriculum in which he pointed out the basic problem of U.S. education, and
proposed a meritocratic educational system (Lucena 2005, p.31).
President Eisenhower selected MIT President James Killian as his full-time
Special Assistant for Science and Technology and established the President’s Science
Advisory Committee (PSAC) (Lucena, 38). In 1951, President Harry S. Truman had
established the Science Advisory Committee as part of the Office of Defense
Mobilization (ODM). As a direct response to the launches of the Sputnik 1 and Sputnik 2,
on October 4 and November 3, 1957, the Science Advisory Committee was upgraded by
President Eisenhower to the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) and moved
to the White House on 21 November 1957. These appointments opened the White House
doors to scientific academism. Robert Kreidler claims that with these appointments
“members of the scientific community were given direct access to the President and an
established means of expressing themselves on matters of science policy (Lucena, 38).
On Oct 10, 1957, only six days after Sputnik’s launch, director of the National
Science Foundation (NSF) Alan Waterman, beginning his quest for money for science
education, told the National Security Council the necessity for effective steps toward
maintaining progress in basic science and the training of capable scientists and engineers
(Lucena, p.41). The President’s budget and subsequent congressional appropriation for
FY 1959 resulted in an increase of 300 percent, to approximately $61 million, for existing
NSF educational programs and for the initiation of new ones. The percentage of the
NSF’s total budget ($137 million) devoted to education reached an all-time high of 45%
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(Lucena, p.41). NSF began to emerge as an institutional solution for the manpower
political problem of the 1960s (Lucena 2005, p.38).
When asked by legislators to explain what was wrong with American science,
German rocket scientist Werner Von Braun called for a massive injection of money and
effort to be directed to the teaching of science (Degroot 2006, p.75). Legislators
responded with calls for a Manhattan Project for space and a West Point for science
(Degroot 2006, p.75). The Advanced Research Projects Agency was created to make sure
that Americans were kept busy with technological projects, not exclusively related to
space, designed to make sure that the United States would never again fall victim to an
embarrassment like Sputnik (Degroot 2006, p.75). The National Defense Education Act
(NDEA) was rocketed through Congress and signed into law by Eisenhower on
September 2, 1958 (Degroot 2006, p.75). A four-year plan for boosting American
education, it provided millions for the purchase of scientific equipment for schools, in
addition to loans and grants for those inclined to go into teaching (Degroot 2006, p.75).
Before long, the NDEA was giving out scholarships to almost any high school graduate
who could present a credible case for wanting to study science at a university (Degroot
2006, p.75).
Immediate policies and proposals emerged after Sputnik that involved the
extension of NSF’s role to nurture elite scientists, establishing the President’s Science
Advisory Committee (PSAC), and the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958.
The purposes of proposed policies were not an increase in armed forces but in enhancing
science education and producing scientists needed for national security.
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2-3. Politics Stream

The politics stream focuses on the interactions between political actors, Congress,
White House, and interest groups with regard to changes in national mood and elections
that bring new administrations to power. Sputnik brought a test on Presidential leadership
and Congressional ability to overcome an imbalance of the superpowers and provide an
improved course for the United States’ science program.
Initially, President Eisenhower was not surprised by Sputnik because he had
expected the event because of information derived from U2 spy planes’ flyover photos.
President Eisenhower steadfastly refused to panic (Degroot 2006, p.77). On October 9,
Eisenhower told a press conference that he saw “nothing…that is significant in that
development as far as security is concerned, except…it does definitely prove the
possession of the Russian scientists of a very powerful thrust in their rocketry…The mere
fact that this thing orbits involves no new discovery of science…so in itself it imposes no
additional threat to the United States.” (Degroot 2006, p.77). He went on to allege that
the reason the Russians had been first in space was because they had “captured all the
German scientists” in Peenemunde (Degroot 2006, p.77). He played five rounds of golf
during the week after the launch, perhaps to drive home the suggestion of calm (Degroot
2006, p.66). Meanwhile, James Hagerty, the White House press secretary, told
journalists that the satellite, while of great scientific interest” did not come as any
surprise; we have never thought of our program as in a race with the Soviet.” (Degroot
2006, p.66).
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Sensing an electoral opportunity, Senator Lyndon Johnson seized the chance to
weight in: “The issue is one which, if properly handled, would blast the Republicans out
of water, unify the Democrat Party, and elect you President.” an aid told the ambitious
senator (Degroot 2006, p.69). Before Sputnik, the Democrats were mired in gloom. The
segregation issue, which had split the party, seemed likely to destroy their chances of
regaining the White House (Degroot 2006, p.69). “The Roman Empire,” Johnson
claimed, “controlled the world because it could build roads. Later the British Empire was
dominant because it had ships. In the air age we were powerful because we had airplanes.
Now the communists have established a foothold in outer space.” (Degroot, p.70). The
history lesson might have been crude and simplistic, but the American people lapped it
up. On another occasion, he claimed: “From space the masters of infinity would have the
power to control the Earth’s weather, to cause drought and flood, to change the tides and
raise the levels of the sea, to divert the Gulf Stream and change temperate climates to
frigid.” (Degroot 2006, p.70). He promised that, whatever the administration’s space
budget, he would convince Congress to increase it, a promise that alarmed the fiscally
conservative Eisenhower. (Degroot 2006, p.70).
In the November edition of Missiles and Rockets, Editor Erik Bergaust wrote “An
Open Letter to President Dwight D. Eisenhower.” The editorial expressed all the
emotions the president feared. “This is the age of science,” Bergaust warned Eisenhower.
“This is the era of intellectual, uninhibited thinking. Tomorrow is here. And you, as the
leader of the greatest nation on Earth, must see to it that this nation will be out in front as
mankind advances into the space age.” (Degroot 2006, p.81). Bergaust called for a
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cabinet-level science adviser, a coherent space program, a new space agency, and
missions to the Moon, Venus, and Mars (Degroot 2006, p.81).
Eisenhower realized that he could not simply ignore the American people’s
feelings of inadequacy. On November 7, before a radio and television audience, he
delivered the first of his “Science in National Security” talks from the White House. It
was in part shaped by a report from the Office of Defense Mobilization and Science
Advisory Committee (ODM-SAC) on the need to improve public appreciation of science,
strengthen the partnership between sciences and the federal government, increase support
for basic research, especially in the Department of Defense, and reform science education
(Wang 2008, p.81). In this address, Eisenhower highlighted science not only as the
driving force in the defense of America, but also as a key to the nation’s future security
and prosperity (Wang 2008, p.82). In response to critics who derided the state of
scientific education in the United States, the president announced that he was appointing
James Killian of MIT the first White House science adviser. (Degroot 2006, p.81). A
week later, in another speech on national security, Eisenhower expanded on the
importance of science education and basic research: “My scientific advisers place this
problem (science education) above all other immediate tasks of producing missiles, of
developing new techniques in the Armed Services.” (Wang 2008, p.82). The upgrade of
the Office of Defense Mobilization and Science Advisory Committee (ODM-SAC) into
the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) in the White House proceeded soon
after the Killian appointment (Wang 2008, p.82).
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In the beginning of 1958, the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare of the U.S.
Congress held some Congressional hearings on “Science and Education for National
Defense” (Lucena 2005, p.31). Senator Lister Hill (D-Ala) shaped the limits of discourse
by enrolling powerful actors such as German rocket scientist Werner Von Braun and U.S.
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover. Both endorsed education programs that were oriented
towards creating a scientific elite. With an impressive lineup of elite scientists, scientific
academics, and high-ranked military officials, Congressional leaders such as Hill were
able to speak of a nation under threat, not just from Soviet communism, but from its
science and technology (Lucena 2005, p.32). Chairman Hill opened the door for
supporting basic scientific research and “brainpower” as means for national survival
(Lucena 2005, p.33).
On April 2, 1958, before a joint session of Congress, Eisenhower called for the
formation of a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The new
agency, which implied a huge investment in space research and development, was
precisely what Eisenhower had wanted to avoid. However, in the hysteria that followed
Sputnik, it was the least he could get away with offering. Eisenhower appointed Keith
Glennan, president of the Case Institute of Technology, the first administrator of the new
agency. The new administrator quickly found that Congress was desperate for a race and
had no scruples about throwing money into space. (Degroot 2006, p.95).
In July 1958, the White House let it be known that it wanted something really big
to counter the impact made by Sputnik 3. Project Score involved broadcasting a recorded
message from a satellite circling the Earth. (Degroot 2006, 97).
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Initially, President Eisenhower tried to avoid a race to space with the Soviet
Union because of the economic burden, but the media formed public opinion on demand
for science education, and the continuous success of Sputnik 2 and Sputnik 3 made him
take actions. He organized a new science committee and appointed new leadership, and
Congress approved a budget for government agencies and passed an educational act to
improve quality and quantity in science education and scientists. Overall, problem
stream, policy stream, and politics stream all played a part in improving and developing
scientific manpower in America.
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CHAPTER FOUR
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

In this chapter, I want to contemplate government financial aid for education in
viewpoints of paternalism and public choice because the nature of policy issues on
education is its redistributive aspect and increasing human capitals. In addition, President
Kennedy and President Johnson were interested in civil rights, eliminating poverty, and
racial injustice. Therefore, science and defense-focused educational reform was shifted to
produce more general human capital for economic growth of the nation and to the
increase of opportunity to access higher education by poor students. Johnson passed the
Higher Education Act on November 8, 1965 by his Great Society domestic agenda. HEA
1965 was designed to provide financial aid to the needy students from lower income
families. Redistributive policies that transfer value to the less advantaged at the expense
of the more advantaged require the convergence of significant forces (Hannah 1996,
p.502). For example, the initiation of basic educational opportunity grants for
postsecondary students with exceptional financial need in HEA 1965 required
presidential leadership, Congressional support, a broad national constituency in the ‘war
on poverty’, the momentum of the civil movement, and a growing economy that could
afford redistribution (Hannah 1996, p.502).

1. Paternalism
Eyal Zamir (2007) defines paternalism as intervention in a person’s freedom
aimed at furthering his or her own good. Gerald Dworkin (1972), however, suggests that
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paternalism is justified only to preserve a wider range of freedom for the individual in
question. He says that the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by
reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values
of the person being coerced. He provides examples of paternalistic interference: laws
requiring motorcyclists to wear safety helmets when operating their machines, laws
forbidding persons from swimming at a public beach when lifeguards are not on duty,
and so on, which place restrictions on the liberty of individuals. I interpret Dworkin’s
paternalistic intervention as an intent to reduce disutility from what otherwise would have
happened with no intervention.
Isbister (2004) asserts that social justice has three components: equality, freedom,
and efficiency. He classifies equality as equality of opportunity and equality of resources,
and distinguishes “freedoms-to” and “freedoms-from”. According to him, “freedoms-to”
are freedoms to do various things such as freedom to worship, speak, publish, assemble,
and petition the government for redress of grievances. “Freedoms-from” are freedoms
from such afflictions as hunger, poverty, illiteracy, sickness, and homelessness (Isbister
2004, p.16). I think that publicly provided education has a duality if one’s utility of being
educated is at least of the same magnitude with one’s disutility of being illiterate.
Thaler and Sunstein (2003) suggest the idea of libertarian paternalism. Traditional
paternalism involves coercion, although the intervention has a good motive. Thaler and
Sunstein define libertarian paternalism as the intervention that nudges people in the
direction that will promote their welfare with no coercion of choice. The government
provides financial aid for higher education with no coercion of going to college, but

43

influences the decision of college enrollment by reducing the price of college education.
As long as there is no penalty for dropping out of college due to lack of financial aid, the
financial aid for college education is not coercion. Financial aid may bring a substitution
effect by reducing the opportunity costs of staying in school, but also bring an income
effect by reducing the price of education. Subsidies can reduce costs and thereby magnify
the relative benefits.
Johnson (1984) provides three ways to justify government subsidization of higher
education. First, there are gross social benefits from highly educated population. Second,
it is socially inefficient not to provide the optimum amount of training to bright young
people just because their families happen to be poor. Third, taxation affects private
human capital accumulation decisions. Too high an income tax may undervalue of
present discounted future income relative to costs after graduating college, which may
affect the decision of college enrollments. Therefore, subsidy can be used to correct for
the distortions caused by the tax system.
According to Isbister (2004), efficiency means getting the best out of the available
resources. Therefore, it is socially inefficient for bright young people from poor
households to be left with inadequate education because society does not get the best out
of the available resources and also does not provide them a “freedom-to” receive
education or a “freedom-from” being illiterate. A paternalistic state must provide the
population access to receive public education and also prevent the population from being
illiterate, and thus population can have a wider range of freedom.
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Leonard et al (2000), however, assert that truly paternalistic policies are
distinguishable from interventions intended to correct market failures that arise from
insufficient information, because even a non-paternalistic state can provide information
to the market. They insist that a paternalist is logically required to believe that the
intervener is better placed than the paternalized person to judge the latter’s welfare.
In terms of educational costs, parents are expected to contribute to the cost of
their children’s postsecondary education. However when their ability is limited,
government can provide an educational subsidy based on need. Trostel (2002) insists that
a subsidy in the form of public provision has the potential to be the most efficient
educational policy because it stimulates investment in human capital. He argues that there
is no practical policy to lower the price of the primary input in human capital production.
In other words, it is impractical to lower the opportunity cost of staying in school.
Therefore, it is not practically possible to stimulate investment in education if there is no
public provision of a subsidy.

2. Public Choice

Public Choice sees voters, politicians, and bureaucrats as self-interested agents
who maximize their own utility. Mancur Olson (1993) shows how self-interested utility
maximization motivates leaders in both autocracy and democracy to provide public goods
to their domains. Thus altruism neither of a necessary condition nor a sufficient condition
for providing public goods, especially for an autocrat.
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Mancur Olson (1993) introduces a new theory of how autocracies and
democracies emerge from anarchy and affect economic development. Of particular
interest is his theory about how a rational self-interested autocrat is motivated to provide
public goods to his citizens, because it is the usual expectation that dictators are more
likely to exploit the population ruthlessly in their domains rather than spending for public
goods. In his theory, however, he emphasizes peaceful order and providing public goods
to make society productive as common factors for both types of government, dictatorship
and democracy. Under anarchy, victims of violence and theft lose what they produced
and also lose the incentive to produce any more goods because roving bandits do not
have any encompassing interest in society. When a roving bandit may steal goods
occasionally and depart immediately, inhabitants can have little incentive to produce or
way to secure accumulate goods. However, if a bandit settles down as a stationary bandit,
he may have an encompassing interest in his domain that encourages him to support a
peaceful order and public goods that increase productivity. According to Olson, having a
dictator as a stationary bandit is better for both the population and the bandit himself in
the sense that the bandit can monopolize theft in the form of taxes regularly and
continuously, and inhabitants can have their own “safe” income after tax and are
provided protection from other thieves. Such protections from other thieves and property
rights on after-tax goods increase output in the society and thus provide more tax
payments to the leader (the stationary bandit). Contrary to the roving bandits, under the
stationary bandit, inhabitants are not a resource to be exploited but a source of tax
payments. Therefore, the leader as stationary bandit has an incentive to protect
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inhabitants in his domain from domestic violence and foreign thieves, and to provide any
public goods that can increase taxable income up to the point where the marginal cost of
providing public goods is equal to the marginal income from increased output.
The rational self-interested autocrat chooses the revenue-maximizing tax rate
instead of behaving like the wolf that preys on the elk. Therefore, monopolization of theft
and the protection of the tax-generating population replaces anarchy with government.
The rational stationary bandit takes only a part of income in taxes, while he has an
incentive to provide other public goods, which can increase taxable income. By providing
more public goods he can thieve more from his subjects in the form of taxes than he
could have stolen by being a roving bandit. Olson says that this mutual incentive from
settling a government is very effective, even in the democratic community, because a
self-interested incumbent president will maximize his chances of reelection by making
the voters better off.

3. Expansion of Reform
John F. Kennedy became the 35the President of the United States in 1961. He
served as President from January 1961 until his assassination in November 1963.
Kennedy’s time in office is also marked by high tensions with Communist states, Soviet
Union and Cuba in particular. Since when he was a senator, he was interested in civil
rights movements. Kennedy cast a procedural vote on the President Eisenhower’s bill for
the Civil Rights Act of 1957. His concerns about civil rights were reflected in his
domestic policy, which was called the New Frontier. Through the New Frontier, he
ambitiously promised federal funding for education, medical care for the elderly,
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economic aid to rural regions, and government intervention to halt the recession.
Moreover, he promised to eliminate racial discrimination. Especially, his racial
integration was very well reflected in his Executive Order 10925, which required
government contractors to take affirmative action to ensure that employees are treated
fairly without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.
On December 14, 1961, Kennedy signed the executive order creating the
Presidential commission on the Status of Women concerning on sexual discrimination.
On June 10, 1963, Kennedy signed the Equal Pay Act of 1963 aiming at abolishing wage
disparity based on sex. On June 11, 1963, Kennedy gave his famous civil rights address,
on national television and radio to provide equal access to public schools and voting
rights.
Sputnik-inspired educational reform was concentrated in science and national
defense related educations led by NSF and NDEA, during the administration of President
Eisenhower. However, as described above, until assassinated on November 22, 1963,
Kennedy had many concerns on civil rights, racial integration, and equal opportunity of
education. These concerns of Kennedy’s domestic policy started to shift the emphasis of
educational reform from science to equal opportunity to access all level of educations
with no racial or sexual discrimination. It does not mean that Kennedy gave up science
education or the space race with the Soviet Union. In fact, he became eager for the United
States to take the lead in the space race by a manned Moon landing (the Apollo program).
On July 20, 1969, almost six years after Kennedy's death, Apollo 11 landed the first
manned spacecraft on the Moon.
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President Lyndon Johnson, Kennedy’s successor, pushed the landmark Civil
Rights Act through a bitterly divided Congress by invoking the slain president's memory.
Finally, President Johnson signed the Act into law on July 2, 1964. The Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ended unequal application of voter registration requirements and racial
segregation in schools, at the workplace and by facilities that served the general public.
While Kennedy emphasized equality under his domestic policy, the New
Frontier, Johnson’s domestic program, Great Society, aimed at elimination of poverty and
racial injustice. New major spending programs were about education, medical care, urban
problems, and transportation. The most important educational component of the Great
Society was the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965, which was
enacted on April 11, 1965. During its first year of operation, the Act authorized a $1.1
billion program of grants to states, for allocations to school districts with large numbers
of children of low income families, funds to use community facilities for education
within the entire community, funds to improve educational research and to strengthen
state departments of education, and grants for the purchase of books and library materials
(Voting Record, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 19657).
In regard to a policy for higher education, the Higher Education Facilities Act
(HEFA) of 1963 was signed into law on December 16, 1963, authorized several times
more college aid within a five-year period than had been appropriated under the Land
Grant College in a century8. It provided better college libraries, new graduate centers,

7

Americans for Democratic Action. http://www.adaction.org/pages/publications/voting-records.php
Remarks Upon Signing the Higher Education Facilities Act, December 16, 1963.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26387
8
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several new technical institutes, classrooms for several hundred thousand students, and
new community colleges a year. The Higher Education Act of 1965 was enacted on
November 8, 1965. The law was intended to strengthen the educational resources of
colleges and universities and to provide financial assistance for students in postsecondary
and higher education. It increased federal money given to universities, created
scholarships and low-interest loans for students, and established a national Teacher Corps
to provide teachers to poverty-stricken areas of the United States. The Act also began a
transition from federally funded institutional assistance to individual student aid.
In summary, Sputnik-inspired educational reform raised federal funding for
defense and space exploration by improving science and engineering education during
Eisenhower. NSF and NDEA were instrumental for producing science and defense
related human capitals. Science and defense emphasizing education was diffused to
producing more general human capitals for economic growth in the administrations of
President Kennedy and the President Johnson. Kennedy’s domestic program, the New
Frontier, was interested in racial integration and the civil rights of African Americans,
women’s equal rights in the work place, and Johnson’s domestic program, the Great
Society, was aimed at elimination of poverty and racial injustice. Kennedy’s educational
concern was more on equal opportunity of accessing public education by minorites than
Eisenhower’s science and defense education. Johnson enacted ESEA, HEFA, and HEA to
provide federal aid for educational institutions, facilities, and students. His educational
policy, led by the federal government, ended a long-standing political taboo by providing
significant federal aid to public education, and also began to switch its purpose from
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providing federal funding to institutions to individual students. Giving financial aid to
students directly might give students more freedoms to choose college to go into a
particular field of study to major. Moreover, figures in the next chapter show an
increasing trend of college enrollments in the 1960s. Diffusing educational policy from
science and defense to all levels of educations might attribute to increasing in college
enrollments.
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CHAPTER FIVE
POLICY OUTPUTS and COLLEGE ENROLLMENTS

So far, I have described a cause and effect relationship between the Soviet
launching of Sputnik 1 and educational reform (policy event) in America. In this chapter,
I want to look inside three selected policy outputs: National Science Foundation (NSF),
National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958, and Higher Education Act (HEA) of
1965.

1. National Science Foundation (NSF)

Signed into law on May 10, 1950, by President Truman, the NSF Act of 1950
authorized and directed the new Foundation “to promote the progress of science, to
advance the national health, prosperity and welfare, to secure the national defense, and to
fulfill other purposes” (Lucena 2005, p.12-13). Although Congress did not intend for
NSF to be a mission-oriented agency, like the Department of Agriculture or NASA, the
Act of 1950 implicitly defined a national mission for NSF (Lucena 2005, p.13). NSF has
been in charge of developing and promoting science and engineering education and
human resources (Lucena 2005, p.13).
After the launching of Sputnik in 1957, NSF has responded to different needs for
scientists and engineers brought upon by national crises in two ways: its human-resource
programs, such as the National Register and Manpower, and its education programs
(Lucena 2005, p.13). The NSF Fellowship program has been scientific academia’s
instrument to ensure high-quality training to a small cadre of top-level scientists. By
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1956, NSF Fellowships were of two kinds: pre-doctoral and postdoctoral. The objective
of the pre-doctoral program was to seek out the most able science students interested in
training beyond the baccalaureate degree and to afford them the opportunity to spend full
time at the institutions of their choice so that each fellow could develop his or her
potentiality as a scientist to the fullest (Lucena 2005, p.39). The post-doctoral
fellowships’ main goal was to provide opportunities for scientists who demonstrated
superior accomplishments in a special field to become still more proficient in their
respective specialty by studying and doing research in outstanding laboratories (Lucena
2005, p.40). After Sputnik, scientific academia framed the specific problem of education
for the NSF as follows: how to provide high-quality education in the sciences to the best
and brightest of free-choosing individuals who will save the nation. Only six days after
Sputnik’s launch, Alan Waterman, began his quest for money for science education. The
President’s budget and subsequent Congressional appropriation for FY 1959 resulted in
an increase of 300 percent, or approximately $61 million, to existing NSF educational
programs and the initiation of new ones. The percentage of the NSF’s total budget ($137
million) devoted to education reached an all-time high of 45% (Lucena 2005, p.41).
By connecting the quality of scientific training to the survival of the nation, NSF
was able to increase its fellowships budget by more than 100% immediately after
Sputnik, from $5.6 million (1527 awards) in FY 1958 to $13 million (3937 awards) in FY
1959 (Lucena 2005, p.43). While in 1956, only two kinds of fellowships existed, by the
early 1960s, the program had developed into seven types of fellowships (Lucena 2005,
p.44). By 1959, the NSF, in cooperation with all federal agencies and scientific

53

organizations engaged in gathering information about scientific manpower, received an
additional mandate from Congress to develop a national program of information on
scientific and technical personnel. The NSF became the government’s repository for
information about U.S. scientific and technological resources, including manpower
(Lucena 2005, p.47). After Sputnik, the NSF emerged as an institutional solution to the
political problem surrounding the production of scientific manpower (Lucena 2005,
p.53).

2. National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958

The National Defense Education Act was signed into law on September 2, 1958
by President Eisenhower. The act authorized funding for four years, increasing funding
each year. For example, funding increased on eight program titles from $183 million in
1959 to $222 million in 1960. Under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Office of Health,
Education, and Welfare, the NDEA provided funds to several kinds of educational
programs: student loans; science, math and foreign language instruction; NDEA general
fellowships; training institutes for counselors; language development research; new
educational media; and vocational programs. It was the most sweeping federal education
legislation in the nation’s history (Lucena 2005, p.35).
Although the NDEA had a major impact on general college education, it had a
relatively minor impact on science education and manpower when compared to the NSF.
The NDEA was oriented mostly to undergraduate loans and fellowships in all areas, and
to increasing education in and providing facilities for foreign languages (Lucena 2005,
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p.35). For example, during FY 1959-63, only 32% of NDEA funds for undergraduate
fellowships went to the physical and natural sciences and 10% to engineering. Fifty-eight
percent went to the social sciences and humanities. Although most of the NDEA’s
activities were modeled after the NSF’s existing programs, the NDEA’s only legislative
link to the NSF was through its authorization of the Scientific Information Service
Program. The difference between NDEA and NSF programs can also be explained in the
way each one defined the problems and solution, in terms of both quality and quantity.
The NDEA was to provide federal assistance to the general population, or the “average”
and “slow,” using Conant’s terms, mostly at elementary and secondary levels, thus
producing large numbers of educated individuals to serve the nation’s needs in
manufacturing, infrastructure, and basic services. The NDEA was to be managed by the
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the same office of the
federal government that also administered health and welfare programs. In short, it was a
comprehensive federal education assistance program for the masses. Meanwhile, NSF
programs provided federal assistance to the “best and brightest” with high-quality
scientific education in order to produce the scientific elite that would lead the U.S.’s basic
scientific research through the Cold War. The NSF, in other words, had become the
headquarters of scientific academia (Lucena 2005, p.36).

55

3. Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965

The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) was signed into United States law on
November 8, 1965, as part of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society domestic
agenda. Education has historically been the exclusive administrative area for state and
local governments. Compared to the NSF educational program and NDEA of 1958, the
HEA provided the first general federal undergraduate scholarships in U.S. history. The
law was designed to strengthen the educational resources of the colleges and universities
of the United States and to provide financial assistance to post-secondary students. The
HEA, as it is known, increased federal money given to post-secondary institutions,
developed scholarship programs, provided low-interest loans to students, and founded a
National Teachers Corps (National Center for Education Statistics).
The HEA 1965 has undergone several reauthorizations and amendments,
including the addition of new title initiatives. Before each reauthorization, Congress
inserts additional programs, changes the language and policies of existing programs, or
makes other changes (National Center for Education Statistics).
The Higher Education Act of 1965 includes eight titles. Especially, Title IV assists
students by supporting undergraduate scholarships, loans with reduced interest rates, and
work-study programs. For the fiscal year 1966, the HEA 1965 provided total
authorization about $1.1 billion for both institutional aid programs and student aid
(McGuire, 2012).
In summary, the purpose of NSF educational program was to provide federal
assistance to the best and brightest scientific elite, and the NDEA was to provide federal
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assistance to the general population at elementary and secondary levels, and
undergraduate programs for science, technology, engineering, mathematics fields. The
purpose of HEA was not in developing science-oriented human capitals, but in
supporting general postsecondary education. Therefore, the Sputnik-inspired educational
reform in America has broadened its purpose and students who receive its financial
support in various fields. The extension of NSF’s role in science education and an
enactment of NDEA 1958 support the suggestion of causality between Sputnik and the
initiation of educational reform in America in early 1960s. The HEA, as a successive
policy, has been contributing in the increase of general college enrollments in various
majors by reauthorization through the years. This paper treats the increase in the supply
of college graduates as a policy outcome by combining of NSF, NDEA, and HEA,
instead of evaluating each of them. The following section provides statistics on college
enrollments by sex, family income, race, and age.
4. College Enrollments9

In 1940, less than one American adult in twenty (4.6 percent) was a college
graduate, but the number had quadrupled to one in five (19.4percent) in 1986. The
percentage of adults with college degrees in the late 1980s was higher than the percentage
with high school diplomas in 1930. College enrollment was up 45 percent between 1970
and 1983 but then leveled off (Orfield, 1990).

9

Data for all figures in this chapter are from Digest of Education Statistics in National Center for
Education Statistics. https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/
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Figure 5. College Enrollments of Recent High School Completers, 16-24 Old

Years

Figure 5 shows the percentage of college enrollment from 1960 to 2012 among 16 to 24
year olds. College enrollments increased drastically between 1960 and 1970. It might be
due to the Sputnik-triggered federal government-led educational reform in early the
1960s. As Freeman (1975) observed, however, college enrollments fell sharply between
1969 and 1973, but began to increase after 1980. Skill-biased technological changes
might be the driving force behind increased college enrollments by deriving demand for
college graduates. The overall trend of enrollment has been upward from 1960 to 2012.
Especially, the percentage of enrollment of females is higher than that of males after
1980.
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Figure 6. Total Fall Enrollment by Sex
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Figure 6 shows total population of college enrollment in fall by sex, in which the number
of college enrollments of females is higher than that of males from 1980, and the overall
trend of enrollment is upward for the entire sample period. Figure 5 and Figure 6 reveal
that, not only in percentage, but also in number, females’ demand for college education is
higher than males since 1980.
Figure 7. College Enrollment of Recent High School Completers by Income Level 10
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Low income refers to the bottom 20% of all family incomes, high income refers to the top 20% of all
family income, and middle income refers to the 60% in between. Digest of Education Statistics.
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Figure 7 shows the percentage of college enrollment by family income level, reflecting
the purpose of higher education policy. The trend of college enrollment of students who
have high family income shows constant enrollment overtime, while the trend of college
enrollment of those who have low family income shows substantial fluctuations,
reflecting sensitive enrollment behavior responses to the government policy on grants or
loans. In other words, government policy on grants or loans seems not to affect college
enrollment for high income families, but it seems very important to the low income
families.

Figure 8. College Enrollment of Recent High School Completers by Race
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Figure 8 shows the percentage of college enrollment by race between ages 16 and 24. In
the early 1970s, college enrollment of Hispanics seemed higher than whites. Whites have
a constant enrollment pattern, while enrollment patterns of Blacks and Hispanics show
much fluctuations. It might not be unrelated with family income to bear costs for college
education. Data for Asians are available only for recent years.
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Figure 9. Total Fall Enrollment by Age
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Figure 9 shows total fall college enrollment by age between 1970 and 2012. Figure 9
reveals that demand for college education has increased since 1980 among young adults.
Increased demand for college education might be derived by increased in demand for
college graduates induced by computer-led industrialization.
All five figures (5-9) report that since 1960, the overall trend of college
enrollment has been increased in race, sex, family income, and age. Parts of increase in
the college enrollments are likely due to Sputnik-triggered educational reform and
government programs such as New Frontier and Great Society, while parts of increase in
the college enrollments are likely due to a shift in demand favoring college graduates by
skill-biased technological changes.
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Figure 10. Bachelor’s Degree Conferred by Field of Study
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Figure 10 shows the percentage of college degrees conferred by postsecondary
institutions from 1970 to 2011. Using data from Digest of Education Statistics 2013, I
calculated the percentages of some science and engineering related fields of study in
order to see how many the NSF and the NDEA 1958 produced college students in the
majors of science and engineering. Unfortunately, there are no data from earlier than
1970. In 1970 to 1971 academic year, the three most conferred fields of study are
Education (21%), Social Science and History (18.50%), Business (13.74%). Compared to
these three fields of study, six fields in Figure 10 are relatively small. Among them,
biological and biochemical sciences is about 4.24%, engineering is about 5.36%,
mathematics and statistics is about 2.95%. Because Figure 10 does not show 1950 and
1960, it is difficult to conjecture how much the NSF and the NDEA 1958 contributed in
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producing science and engineering related human capitals. Overall, however, the pattern
of each field of study in Figure 10 shows downward slope.

Figure 11. Tuition and Required Fees ($2012-2013 Constant dollars)
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Figure 11 shows average undergraduate tuition and fees charged for full-time students in
degree-granting postsecondary institutions from 1963 to 2011. Private institutions include
both non-profit and for-profit institutions. Figure 11 reveals that, during the 1970s when
college enrollments were low, price of tuition was also lower than any other periods.
Since 1980, however, tuition and fees have been increased for both public institutions and
private institutions. Especially, tuitions and fees of private institutions are more than
double the price of public institutions. Increases in tuition and fees are not unrelated to
the increase in college enrollments. Demand for college education may increase the price
of tuition and relevant fees. When the federal government extended its educational
reform from science-oriented education (NSF, NDEA) to general postsecondary
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education (HEA), it might not have expected soaring college tuition. Therefore, it might
be an unintended consequence of extending college education.

Figure 12. Percentage of Undergraduates Receiving Federal Financial Aid by Race
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Figure 12 shows the percentage of undergraduates receiving financial aid from the federal
government by race11. Black, American Indian, and Hispanic undergraduate students
have a higher percentage of receiving federal aid relative to Whites, regardless of whether
it is loan or grant. From the perspective of equality of opportunity to access higher
education, there seems to be no racial discrimination in federal aid.

11

Asian is undervalued because Hawaiian and Pacific Islanders are excluded. Data are not available for
early 1960s.
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Table 3. Average Amount ($) of Federal Financial Aid Awarded to Full-time,
Full-Year Undergraduates by Race
1992

1995

1999

2003

2007

2011

White, non-Hispanic

4297

5549

8659

7318

8040

10760

Black, non-Hispanic

4329

5262

8476

7901

8970

11890

Hispanic

3666

4644

7084

6670

7370

10190

Asian American12

4111

5106

9221

6745

7400

9520

American Indian

4047

5046

8343

7463

7650

9980

Table 3 shows the average amount of financial aid from federal government. It cannot be
compared across different times because dollar amounts are not converted to constant
dollars. However, Black and White students receive more aid than other races on average.
In summary, the long-term perspective of higher education policy has contributed
to an increase in college enrollments by all aspects such as sex, race, age, and family
income. College enrollments of females have outnumbered that of males since 1980.
College enrollments of students from middle and low income households are much lower
than students from high income households. However, overall enrollments show an
upward trend from 1975 to 2013. White students show relatively constant and upward
trends of enrollments, while enrollment trends of Hispanic and Black students have much
fluctuations but upward trends overall. Despite emphasizing science-oriented education,
conferred rates of Bachelor’s degrees of Mathematics, Physical Sciences are very low.
Engineering and Biological Sciences have relatively higher conferred rates.

12

Hawaiian and Pacific Islanders are excluded.
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As an unintended consequence, tuition and required fees of college education
have been soared up. Especially, tuition of private institutions is much higher than that of
public institutions. Minorities, such as Black, American Indian, and Hispanic college
students, have received a higher percentage of federal financial aid than White students.
It seems there is no racial discrimination for access to federal aid. Average amounts ($) of
federal financial aid are higher for Black or White students.

5. Sputnik-Induced Federalism in American Educational System

Before Sputnik, there had been no national consensus about what kind of
education and what level of federal involvement was best for the nation. The American
public was still content with liberal education for the mainstream, while the military was
trying to define the problem of education as a matter of numbers (Lucena 2005, p.26).
Sputnik made the question of federal involvement in education more important, however.
Congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle and the President reached a consensus
on the importance of science education for the nation’s survival (Lucena 2005, 27).
Proposals for the federal government’s intervention in education were acceptable as long
as they would not interfere with the constitutional rights of states and localities (Lucena
2005, 33).
The history of federal government’s involvement in education dates back to the
1860s. A land-grant university (also called land-grant institution) is an institution of
higher education in the United States designed by a state to receive the benefits of the
Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890. The Morrill Acts funded educational institutions by
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granting federally controlled land to the states for them to sell to raise funds to establish
and endow "land-grant" colleges. The mission of these institutions as set forth in the 1862
Act is to focus on the teaching of practical agriculture, science, military science and
engineering as a response to the industrial revolution and changing social class.
The first land-grant bill was introduced in Congress by Representative Justin
Smith Morrill of Vermont in 1857. A second Morrill Act was passed in 1890, aimed at
the former Confederate states. This act required each state to show that race was not an
admissions criterion, or else to designate a separate land-grant institution for persons of
color.
The mission of the land-grant universities was expanded by the Hatch Act of 1887,
which provided federal funds to states to establish a series of agricultural experiment
stations under the direction of each state's land-grant college. The outreach mission was
further expanded by the Smith-Lever Act of 1914, which sending of agents into rural
areas to help bring the results of agricultural research to the end users.
The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act was signed into law by President Roosevelt
on June 22, 1944, commonly known as the G.I. Bill of Rights. The 1944 GI Bill allowed
returning World War II veterans to continue their education and met twin national goals
of obligation and economic development (Hannah, 1992). Benefits included low-cost
mortgages, low-interest loans to start a business, cash payments of tuition and living
expenses to attend university, high school or vocational education. By 1956, roughly 2.2
million veterans had used the G.I. Bill education benefits in order to attend colleges or
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universities, and an additional 5.6 million used these benefits for some kind of training
program.
Figure 13. Federal R&D Outlays, 1949-2005 ($2000FY)13

Figure 13 shows federal outlays for the conduct of research and development from 1940
to 2007. It includes both national defense and nondefense. Figure 13 shows a dramatic
change in federal outlays before and after 1957, reflecting impacts of Sputnik. Federal
outlays hit the peak in 1967 and shows some declines but are an upward overall.

The National Science Foundation (NSF) was established by the National Science
Foundation Act of 1950 as an independent federal agency to support fundamental
research and education in all the non-medical fields of science and engineering. The
agency’s initial budget was just $151,000 for 9 months. After the event of Sputnik in
1957, Congress increased the NSF appropriation to $136 million for the 12 months

Source: President’s Budget 2007. Fiscal Year 2007. Table 9.7 - Summary of Outlays for the Conduct of
Research and Development: 1949-2007. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys
13

68

beginning July 1, 1958. The NSF’s astronomy program provides all the U.S. federal
support for ground-based astronomy. In 1960, the NSF’s appropriation was $152.7
million and 3000 grants were made.
The National Defense Educational Act (NDEA) was signed into law on
September 2, 1958, providing funding to United States education institutions at all levels.
Especially, it was designed to provide the country with specific defense oriented
personnel. The act, however, provided financial assistance for thousands of students who
would be part of the growing numbers enrolling at colleges and universities in the 1960s.
The act authorized funding for four years, increasing funding per year, and funded on
eight program titles from $183 million in 1959 to $222 million in 1960.
Figure 14. Expenditure for Education by Federal Government14

Figure 14 shows federal spending on education by educational level. Since 1965, Federal
spending has increased for elementary and secondary as well as postsecondary education.

14

Source: Figure 20 in Chapter 4. Digest of Education Statistics 2013.
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/figures/fig_20.asp?referrer=figures
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Figure 15. Expenditure for Higher Education 1962-200815
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Figure 15 shows expenditures for higher education by federal, state, and local
governments for 1962 to 2008. State and local agencies have historically dominated
public education, and the traditional task of the Department of Education had been to
provide assistance and advice to state and local school agencies. In 1965, the Johnson
administration and Congress were working together, both controlled by the Democratic
Party. The Higher Education Act of 1965 was passed under President Johnson, along
with the Economic Opportunity Act, the Elementary and Secondary Schools Act, and the
Civil Rights Act, which together were intended to eliminate poverty and discrimination
(Keppel, 1987). The Higher Education Act of 1965 includes eight titles. Especially, Title
IV assists students by supporting undergraduate scholarships, loans with reduced interest
rates, and work-study programs. For the fiscal year 1966, HEA 1965 provided total
authorization for about $1.1 billion for both institutional aid programs and student aid.

15

http://www.usgovernmentspending.com
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Title IV also requires higher education institutions to be accredited by a federally
recognized accrediting agency (McGuire, 2012).
In the Nixon administration, Pell Grants were established for needy students. The
War on Poverty tried to help recruit inner-city students for college, and federal civil
rights agencies and courts threatened white colleges in the South that failed to integrate
minority students and faculty (Orfield, 1990). Both federal funding and commitment to
equal education receded in the 1980s, however. The federal government’s share of the
total college costs peaked in 1979 and decreased in the 1980s. By 1985, federal funds
were paying just a tenth (10.5 percent) of the costs of public higher education and a sixth
(16.5 percent) of the costs of private colleges and universities (Orfield, 1990).
The 1972 reauthorization of the HEA replaced Educational Opportunity Grants
(EOGs) with Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG) that were given directly to
the student. Along with this change, a federal evaluation of need was created that moved
the assessment of financial need away from institutionally based criteria to a centralized
federal process to make it more equitable and standardized. The BEOGs were very
successful, with funding expanding quite rapidly in the early years after their
introduction, helping to solidify the federal government’s role in ensuring equity in
postsecondary education access (Gilbert and Heller, 2013). 1972 ushered in a decade of
Democratic control in Congress and bipartisan support for education in the White House.
The result was a steady expansion in both eligibility and participation in federal student
aid programs (Hannah, 1992).
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CHAPTER SIX
EMPIRICAL STUDY

This empirical study focuses on wage effects of industry-occupational segregation
in the labor market. According to Acemoglu’s theory, the pooling and separating
equilibria, when skilled workers become more abundant, firms find it profitable to design
jobs for them rather than pool across the two skill groups. A simple relative supplydemand approach would predict a decline in the relative wages of skilled workers in
response to increase in supply of skilled workers. In the pooling and separating equilibria,
however, skilled workers work with higher capital and obtain higher wages in separating
equilibrium while unskilled workers receive less in separating equilibrium.
To measure segregation in the labor market at the state level, I use the Duncan
Segregation Index for two educational groups: college and higher educated (skilled
workers), and less than college educated (unskilled workers). Although skill and
education are not linearly related, educational attainments are best proxy in the census
data set.
𝑛

𝑚

1
𝐼 = ∑ ∑|𝐻𝑖𝑜 − 𝐿𝑖𝑜 |,
2

𝐻𝑖𝑜 ≡

𝑖=1 𝑜=1

ℎ𝑖𝑜
,
ℎ

𝐿𝑖𝑜 ≡

𝑙𝑖𝑜
𝑙

𝐻𝑖𝑜 : Percent of highly educated workers in industry 𝑖 and occupation 𝑜
ℎ𝑖𝑜 : Number of employment of highly educated workers in industry 𝑖 and occupation 𝑜
ℎ: Total employment of highly educated workers.
𝐿𝑖𝑜 : Percent of less educated workers in industry 𝑖 and occupation 𝑜
𝑙𝑖0 : Number of employment of less educated workers in industry 𝑖 and occupation 𝑜
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𝑙: Total employment of less educated workers.
There is no segregation in any occupation category if Index = 0, while there is complete
segregation in all occupation categories if Index = 1. In this paper, highly educated
workers are defined as those with four or more years of college, while less educated
workers are those with less than four years of college. Moreover, considering that each
state has different industrial compositions, a formula is used to measure industryoccupational segregation. To control outliers, industry-occupation cells containing less
than 10 observations are excluded. This gave a total of 613 cells, containing about 73%
of total employments in the sample for year 2000 data set.

Figure 16. Concept of Occupational Segregation by Skill Groups
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Figure 16 is the combined conception of the pooling and separating equilibria with the
Duncan Segregation Index. Although the Duncan Segregation Index takes absolute value,
the absolute term on the X-axis is removed for heuristic purpose. Zero on the X-axis
means complete pooling equilibrium in which firms create only a single type of job for
both skilled and unskilled workers, and the corresponding wage level is “𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ”
in the Y-axis. I do not distinguish wage difference between skilled and unskilled workers
in pooling equilibrium. As skilled workers become abundant, occupations are separated
for the skilled and for the unskilled. “-1” represents that occupations are completely
segregated by unskilled workers, while “1” represents that occupations are completely
segregated by skilled workers. Accordingly, skilled workers obtain higher wages while
unskilled workers receive lower wages in separating equilibrium.
The first empirical concern is the relationship between industry-occupational
segregation and percentage population with college and higher education. Acemoglu’s
theory predicts that, as the share of the population with college and higher education
increases, industry-occupational segregation will increase. The second empirical concern
is the relationship between job mismatch and industry-occupational segregation.
Acemoglu’s theory predicts that in separating equilibrium, job mismatch becomes lower
for both skilled and unskilled workers because jobs are separated and firms spend more
resources to screen in hiring to find well-matched workers. Searching costs are higher in
the pooling equilibrium because few skilled workers are available, but searching costs are
lower in the separating equilibrium because skilled workers are abundant.
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To measure job mismatch, I use both Duncan-Hoffman and Verdugo-Verdugo
mismatch measurements because they have a different definition of the required
education as explained in the literature review. The third empirical concern is interaction
term between the mismatch variable and the segregation index. It has been proven that
overeducation itself has a heavy wage penalty. The interaction term will tell us whether
the wage penalty from overeducation is higher or lower in separating equilibrium. The
fourth empirical concern is the relative wage of college educated workers to high school
educated workers.

1. Summary Statistics

Table 4. Summary Statistics
1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Female

39.32
(10.67)
0.28

38.90
(11.56)
0.32

37.46
(11.48)
0.34

37.86
(10.35)
0.40

39.75
(10.21)
0.42

Married

0.78

0.77

0.70

0.65

0.62

Racial Category
White

0.91

0.90

0.89

0.89

0.87

Black

0.07

0.08

0.08

0.08

0.08

Asian

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.01

Hispanic

0.02

0.02

0.03

0.03

0.04

0.45

0.35

0.18

0.09

0.06

High school

0.33

0.39

0.43

0.39

0.35

Some college

0.12

0.16

0.22

0.30

0.33

College

0.06

0.06

0.11

0.16

0.18

Age

Educational Category
Less than high school

75

Over college

0.04

0.04

0.07

0.06

0.07

Less than college

0.90

0.90

0.83

0.78

0.75

College and more

0.10

0.10

0.17

0.22

0.25

22.25
(11.67)
631.26
(554.66)

21.32
(12.44)
609.27
(567.13)

18.82
(12.14)
501.62
(530.39)

18.71
(10.68)
464.24
(459.52)

20.37
(10.40)
523.24
(448.31)

0.30

0.27

0.23

0.23

0.20

Midwest

0.30

0.30

0.29

0.26

0.28

South

0.25

0.28

0.31

0.34

0.36

West

0.15

0.14

0.16

0.17

0.17

In metro

0.74

0.75

0.83

n.a.

0.79

30194.88
(16907.47)
592.06
(331.52)
n.a.
(n.a.)

37130.50
(23780.01)
728.05
(466.27)
n.a.
(n.a.)

40401.98
(23750.72)
792.20
(465.70)
18.46
(10.32)

39308.56
(27519.50)
770.76
(539.60)
17.45
(10.99)

40538.93
(27635.39)
794.88
(541.87)
17.72
(10.74)

0.11

0.12

0.15

0.17

0.16

Professional

0.07

0.06

0.08

0.10

0.12

Technical

0.29

0.28

0.31

0.33

0.33

Service

0.08

0.07

0.05

0.07

0.08

Precision

0.17

0.18

0.18

0.15

0.15

Operator

0.29

0.29

0.23

0.19

0.17

0.36

0.41

0.46

0.46

0.46

Over education

0.22

0.21

0.31

0.32

0.34

Under education

0.43

0.37

0.23

0.22

0.20

Years overeducation

0.58

0.53

0.78

0.62

0.59

Experience
Experience-squared

Geographical Category
Northeast

Annual Wage ($1999)
Weekly Wage ($1999)
Hourly Wage ($1999)

Occupation Category
Managerial

Duncan-Hoffman Mismatch
Required education

76

(1.36)
-1.45
(2.11)
11.95
(1.95)

(1.30)
-1.25
(2.09)
12.31
(1.30)

(1.47)
-0.69
(1.55)
12.54
(1.51)

(1.18)
-0.62
(1.37)
13.15
(1.85)

(1.13)
-0.58
(1.33)
13.38
(1.97)

Verdugo-Verdugo Mismatch
VV required education

0.68

0.76

0.76

0.75

0.76

VV overeducation

0.17

0.10

0.12

0.12

0.13

VV undereducation

0.15

0.14

0.12

0.12

0.11

0.45
(0.07)
0.33
(0.04)
0.12
(0.03)
0.06
(0.01)
0.04
(0.01)
0.90
(0.02)
0.10
(0.02)

0.35
(0.09)
0.39
(0.05)
0.16
(0.05)
0.06
(0.02)
0.04
(0.01)
0.90
(0.03)
0.10
(0.03)

0.18
(0.06)
0.43
(0.05)
0.22
(0.05)
0.11
(0.02)
0.07
(0.02)
0.83
(0.04)
0.17
(0.04)

0.09
(0.04)
0.37
(0.06)
0.30
(0.05)
0.17
(0.04)
0.07
(0.02)
0.77
(0.06)
0.23
(0.06)

0.06
(0.02)
0.34
(0.06)
0.33
(0.04)
0.19
(0.04)
0.08
(0.02)
0.73
(0.06)
0.27
(0.06)

National Level

69.90

70.88

60.59

59.45

59.08

State Level

46.40
(7.33)

47.26
(6.92)

41.85
(6.28)

42.44
(5.55)

44.24
(5.78)

Years undereducation
Years required education

Population (%) by Education
Level at Residence State
Less than high school
High school
Some college
College
Over college
Less than college
College and more
Segregation Index

The data for this study are random samples from IPUMS-USA one percent of
1960, 1970, and five percent of 1980, 1990, and 2000. I limited the sample to those who
are employed or temporarily out of work and between the age 18 and 60, and were born
in the United States excepting American territories. Geographical analysis includes only
48 contiguous states. I also excluded all those who are in the agriculture, forestry, fishing,
armed forces, and public administration industries. To control for outliers, for example in
case of 2000, I exclude everyone whose hourly wage is less than $5.15 (minimum wage
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in 2000) or greater than $100, or whose weekly wage is less than $103 (($5.15 * 40
hours)/2). Workers in the sample are year-round (50 to 52 weeks) full-time workers
(usually worked more than 35 hours per week).
For the mismatch measure, I used the Duncan-Hoffman measure and the
Verdugo-Verdugo measure. The Duncan-Hoffman mismatch uses the mode years of
education in each occupation to define required education, so one is categorized as
overeducated (undereducated) if his or her educational attainment is greater (lower) than
required years of education. Moreover, the Duncan-Hoffman mismatch measures the
return to an additional year of schooling beyond required schooling, as well as the return
to year of underschooling below required schooling. Mismatched workers are compared
to workers who are in the same occupation holding required schooling.
Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch uses mean years of education plus/minus one
standard deviation in each occupation to define required education. Mismatched workers
are compared to workers with the same level of schooling who hold adequately matched
jobs regardless of occupations. Table 4 summary statistics show that the incidence rate of
the Duncan-Hoffman mismatch is higher than that of the Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch for
overeducation. It might be because Verdugo-Verdugo required education is higher than
Duncan-Hoffman required education. Years of required education have been increased,
which means that college graduates have been increased. The percent (%) population
with college education by state of residence have been increased, while percent
population with less than college education have decreased over the period studied. The
average industry-occupation segregation index has increased for 1980 to 2000 at state
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level, and the standard deviation has become smaller. Although the segregation index
does not show a clear trend at the national level for 1980 to 2000, the segregation index at
the state level reveals that the labor market has been transformed from the pooling
equilibrium to the separating equilibrium for 1980 to 2000, but the index itself was much
higher in 1970 and in 1960. Overall, these summary statistics reveals that the proportion
of population that is college educated, segregation index, and required years education
have all increased.
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Figure 17. Segregation Index vs. Population of College and More Educated
By State of Residence, 2000
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Figure 17 shows the relationship between industry-occupational segregation index and
population with college and higher education based on state of residence for the 48
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contiguous states in the U.S. The slope of the fitted line tells us that segregation index
increases 3.77% to a change in 10 percent increase in mean population of high education,
ceteris paribus. This tells us that states where more of the population has a higher
education are also more likely to have higher occupational segregation, as Acemoglu’s
theory predicts.
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Figure 18. Segregation Index by State (%), 2000
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has the lowest index (16.38%), while Pennsylvania has the highest index (51.05%).
Based on the definition of segregation index, I can interpret the above figure as that the
job market in Wyoming as a whole state is relatively less segregated between highly
educated and less educated workers than the job market in the Pennsylvania. In other
words, the overall job market in Wyoming is a relatively pooling equilibrium, while the
overall job market in Pennsylvania is a relatively separating equilibrium. Therefore, we
can expect that returns to schooling, and job mismatch may be different between two
states.

Figure 19. Overeducation vs. Segregation Index by State of Residence, 2000
A. Duncan-Hoffman Overeducation
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Figure 18 shows the rank order of segregation index by the state of residence. Wyoming
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B. Verdugo-Verdugo Overeducation
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Figure 19 shows the relationship between overeducation and segregation index by state of
residence. Figure A is Duncan-Hoffman overeducation, measured by greater than mode
year of education in each occupation. Figure B is Verdugo-Verdugo overeducation,
measured by mean years of education greater than one standard deviation in each
occupation. Acemoglu’s theory predicts that there will be less overeducations in the
separating equilibrium than in the pooling equilibrium because overeducated workers
switch to higher-wage jobs more quickly than others.
The pattern of overeducation in the Duncan-Hoffman overeducation is consistent
with Acemoglu’s theory, showing downward slope as segregation index increases. The
slope of the fitted line is almost flat in the Verdugo-Verdugo overeducation and
statistically insignificant.
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A. Duncan-Hoffman Overeducation
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B. Verdugo-Verdugo Overeducation
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Figure 20. Overeducation vs. College Population by State of Residence, 2000
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Figure 20 shows the relationship between overeducation and population with college and
higher education by state of residence. Coefficients of both Duncan-Hoffman and
Verdugo-Verdugo measurements are statistically significant. Especially, VerdugoVerdugo measurement shows an almost linear relationship between overeducation and
population with college and higher education. It appears as that states with more
population with higher education are more likely to have higher overeducation.

Table 5. Duncan-Hoffman Overeducation by Occupations, 2000
Overeducation-Most

Overeducation-Least

1

Transportation ticket and reservation agents

Subject instructors (HS/college)

2

Kindergarten and earlier school teachers

Psychologists

3

Engineering technicians

Social scientists

4

Administrative support jobs

Protective services

5

Insurance adjusters, examiners, and investigators

Medical scientists

6

Precision makers, repairers, and smiths

Physical scientists

7

Office supervisors

Physicists and astronomers

8

Managers of properties and real estate

Speech therapists

9

Recreation workers

Photographers

10

Aircraft mechanics

Vocational and educational counselors

11

Chemical technicians

Broadcast equipment operators

12

Library assistants

Special education teachers

13

Supervisors of personal service jobs

Buyers, wholesale and retail trade

14

Computer and peripheral equipment operators

Announcers

15

Surveyors, cartographers, mapping scientists and
technicians

Lawyers

16

Teachers

Legal assistants, paralegals, legal support

17

Construction inspectors

Advertising and related sales jobs
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18

Other science technicians

Designers

19

Customer service reps, investigators and adjusters,
except insurance

Police, detectives, and private
investigators

20

Material recording, scheduling, production,
planning, and expediting clerks

Insurance sales occupations

Table 5 shows the 20 most overeducated occupations and 20 least overeducated
occupations out of 300 occupations. Overeducation is measured based on DuncanHoffman mode year of education in each occupation. According to Table 5, the
occupation of ‘Transportation Ticket and Reservation Agents’ is the most overeducated
occupation, while ‘Subject Instructors (HS/College)’ is the least overeducated occupation
for year-round full-time U.S. born workers. Overeducation is a relative concept
geographically. A worker with a required education in a region can be overeducated in a
different region, even in the same industry-occupation. If there is no physical barrier
between labor markets, however, workers will migrate to find a well-matched job as long
as benefit is higher than moving costs.

Table 6. Duncan-Hoffman Undereducation by Occupations, 2000
Undereducation-Most

Undereducation-Least

1

Legal assistants, paralegals, legal support

Library assistants

2

Police, detectives, and private investigators

Statistical clerks

3

Art/entertainment performers and related

Freight, stock, and materials handlers

4

Photographers

Motion picture projectionists

5

Broadcast equipment operators

Purchasing agents and buyers, of farm
products

6

Buyers, wholesale and retail trade

Transportation ticket and reservation
agents
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7

Vocational and educational counselors

Insurance adjusters, examiners, and
investigators

8

Insurance sales occupations

Power plant operators

9

Social scientists

Interviewers, enumerators, and surveyors

10

Real estate sales occupations

Computer and peripheral equipment
operators

11

Salespersons

Secretaries

12

Purchasing managers, agents and buyers

Other plant and system operators

13

Managers in education and related fields

Payroll and timekeeping clerks

14

Management support occupations

Administrative support jobs

15

Designers

Bank tellers

16

Announcers

Dental assistants

17

Physical scientists

Typists

18

Biological technicians

Patternmakers and model makers

19

Managers and administrators

Correspondence and order clerks

20

Insurance underwriters

Office supervisors

Table 6 shows the 20 most undereducated occupations and 20 least undereducated
occupations out of 300 occupations. Undereducation is measured based on DuncanHoffman mode year of education in each occupation. According to the table 6, ‘Legal
Assistants’ is the most undereducated occupation, while ‘Library Assistants’ is the least
undereducated occupation for year-round full-time U.S. born workers.
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2. Empirical Specification
Empirical specification analyzes wage effects of industry-occupational
segregation and job mismatch. I use a simple OLS wage equation, including segregation
index, mismatch, and interaction terms. Duncan segregation index applied in this
regression is the industry-occupational segregation at the state level.
𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆) = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 (𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+ 𝜷𝟐 (𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜷𝟑 (𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+ 𝜷𝟒 (𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 ∗ 𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+ 𝜷𝟓 (𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 ∗ 𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝚽𝒊 𝚭𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊

Acemoglu’s theory predicts that when skilled workers are abundant, employers react to
that supply by creating separate jobs for the skilled and the unskilled. Employers make
investments in capital for the skilled workers to improve productivity and thus to get
more profits, while depressing wage for unskilled workers. Therefore, as labor markets
are segregated between skilled and unskilled workers, average wage rate will increase
more than in the pooling equilibrium. Beta 1 captures the effect of occupational
segregation on wage rate. Beta 2 and Beta 3 capture wage penalty from mismatch. Their
sign and magnitude depend on mismatch measurements whether it is Duncan-Hoffman
mismatch or Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch.
Marginal effects of segregation are measured by the partial derivative
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𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= 𝜷𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 + 𝜷𝟓 𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
𝝏 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏

𝑯𝒚𝒑𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝟏:

𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
>𝟎
𝝏 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏

Beta 4 and Beta 5 are interaction term between segregation indexes and mismatch
measurements. The purpose of interaction term is to see how labor market segregation
effects on wage in the relation with mismatch. In other words, it will tell us whether the
wage penalty is higher or lower in highly segregated labor market. I hypothesize that
overall marginal effect of segregation on wage is positive in the full specification.
Ζ𝑖 is a vector of covariates including, marital status (married with spouse
present=1, otherwise=0), four racial dummies (White non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic,
Asian non-Hispanic, Hispanic), five education dummies (High school=0, less than high
school, some college, college, more than college), labor market experiences (=ageeducation-6, experience squared, tripled, quadrupled), four geographical dummies by
census region (Northeast=0, Midwest, South, West), metropolitan status (in metro=1,
otherwise=0) and six occupational dummies (precision or operator=0, managerial,
professional, technical, service based on OCC1990 broad occupation category in the
IPUMS-USA).
Because I use individual level data and the Segregation variable is defined based
on state, OLS standard errors should not be used because they do not account for intracluster correlation. Therefore, I report standard errors clustered by state.
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3. Results
3-1. Wage Effects of Industry-Occupational Segregation & Mismatch
Regressions were run with three different specifications for only male samples.
Specification 1:
𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆) = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 (𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝚽𝒊 𝚭𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
Specification 1 includes segregation index with covariates.
Specification 2:
𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 (𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+ 𝜷𝟐 (𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜷𝟑 (𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝚽𝒊 𝚭𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
Specification 2 includes segregation index with covariates and two mismatch
measurements: Duncan-Hoffman mismatch and Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch.
Specification 3:
𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆) = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 (𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+ 𝜷𝟐 (𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜷𝟑 (𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+ 𝜷𝟒 (𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 ∗ 𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+ 𝜷𝟓 (𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 ∗ 𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝚽𝒊 𝚭𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
Specification 3 is a full specification, which includes segregation index,
mismatch, interaction term between mismatch and segregation index, and covariates.
Covariates in the each regression are marital status dummy, four racial dummies,
five education dummies, labor market experiences, four regional dummies, metropolitan
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status dummy, and six occupational dummies. The dependent variable is log weekly
wage converted to 1999 constant dollar value.
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Table 7. Specification (1) for Wage Effects of Industry-Occupational Segregation
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999)
1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Segregation Index

0.00165
(0.00150)

0.00202
(0.00187)

0.00230
(0.00141)

0.00576***
(0.00206)

0.00286*
(0.00165)

Covariates

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Mismatch Variables

N

N

N

N

N

Observations

108228

114897

636312

822145

847385

R-squared

0.360

0.390

0.363

0.388

0.377

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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Table 7 is the regression result of wage effects of industry-occupational segregation by
regression specification (1). The specification (1) is the simplest specification and
includes segregation index, covariates but excludes mismatch variables, purposing isolate
wage effects of segregation from wage effects of job mismatch.
Table 7 reveals that average wage rate is higher in states where industryoccupations are more separated between skilled (college and more educated) and
unskilled workers (less than college educated). The magnitudes of coefficient are
increasing up to 1990 and decreased in 2000, but coefficients are statistically significant
for 2000 and 1990 only.
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Table 8. Specification (2) for Wage Effects of Industry-Occupational Segregation
A. Duncan-Hoffman Mismatch
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999)
1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Segregation Index

0.00158
(0.00140)

0.00192
(0.00184)

0.00228
(0.00140)

0.00574***
(0.00206)

0.00282*
(0.00164)

Years of Over education

0.04419***
(0.00301)

0.04321***
(0.00276)

0.02376***
(0.00154)

0.02629***
(0.00138)

0.01293***
(0.00119)

Years of Under education

-0.03653***
(0.00248)

-0.02664***
(0.00214)

-0.02679***
(0.00149)

-0.03041***
(0.00125)

-0.02884***
(0.00116)

Years of Required education

0.04710***
(0.00293)

0.02126***
(0.00465)

0.02166***
(0.00344)

0.07381***
(0.00204)

0.07206***
(0.00145)

Covariates

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Observations

108228

114897

636312

822145

847385

0.366

0.395

0.388

R-squared
0.373
0.396
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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B. Verdugo-Verdugo Mismatch
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999)
1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Segregation Index

0.00165
(0.00150)

0.00201
(0.00187)

0.00230
(0.00141)

0.00576***
(0.00206)

0.00285*
(0.00164)

Over education

-0.02581***
(0.00566)

-0.00883
(0.00583)

-0.01995***
(0.00484)

-0.05812***
(0.00534)

-0.06606***
(0.00637)

Under education

-0.03729***
(0.01354)

-0.01635*
(0.00892)

-0.02302***
(0.00542)

0.03694***
(0.00522)

0.07127***
(0.00604)

Covariates

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Observations

108228

114897

636312

822145

847385

0.364

0.389

0.378

R-squared
0.361
0.390
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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Table 8 is the regression result for wage effects of industry-occupational segregation by
regression specification (2). The specification (2) includes segregation index, covariates
and two mismatch measures.
Table A is the regression result with Duncan-Hoffman mismatch, while Table B
is the regression result with Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch. Coefficient of segregation has
positive wage effects in both Table A and Table B, but the magnitudes are a little bit
smaller with Duncan-Hoffman mismatch and almost same with Verdugo-Verdugo
mismatch.
In Table A, Duncan-Hoffman years of overeducation measures the returns to
additional year of education beyond the required educational attainment, while years of
undereducation measures the returns to additional year of education below the required
educational attainment. Table A says that the coefficient of overeducation is positive but
smaller than that of required education, which is called the wage penalty. In other words,
returns to additional year of education beyond the required education are positive but
much smaller than that of required education (0.01293 < 0.07206, in 2000), while returns
to additional year of education below the required education are negative (-0.02884 <
0.07206, in 2000). It is natural in the sense that additional years of overeducation beyond
required education are unproductive; therefore, returns are positive, but smaller than
those who have required education.
The coefficient of required education has been increased since 1970, which means
that returns to years of required education have been substantially increased. The
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coefficient of overeducation has been decreased since 1960, which means that wage
penalty for holding an additional year of education has been substantially increased.
Table B is the regression result with Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch. Overeducation
and undereducation are dummy variables in the Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch. In Table B,
the coefficient of overeducation is negative (which is called wage penalty) and the
coefficient of undereducation is positive (which is called substantial wage premium),
which is consistent with empirical findings from previous literatures. It tells us that,
relative to workers who have required education, wage penalty related with
overeducation is substantially higher. The coefficient of undereducation is positive only
in 1990, 2000, which there are wage premiums related with undereducation. Absolute
value of coefficient of overeducation has been increased since 1970, which means that
wage penalty from overeducation has been substantially increased.
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Table 9. Specification (3) for Wage Effects of Industry-Occupational Segregation.
A. Duncan-Hoffman Mismatch
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999)

Segregation Index

Years of Over education
Segregation*Years of Over education

Years of Under education
Segregation*Years of Under education

Years of Required education
Segregation*Years of Required education

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

-0.00428
(0.00310)

-0.01073*
(0.00633)

-0.00973*
(0.00518)

-0.00544
(0.00434)

-0.00707*
(0.00398)

0.04134***
(0.01402)

0.00392
(0.02080)

-0.00754
(0.01037)

-0.02808***
(0.01037)

-0.02654**
(0.01045)

0.00006
(0.00031)

0.00081*
(0.00042)

0.00075***
(0.00026)

0.00129***
(0.00024)

0.00089***
(0.00023)

-0.05459***
(0.01106)

-0.04710***
(0.01356)

-0.04269***
(0.00933)

-0.03089***
(0.01054)

-0.02323***
(0.00757)

0.00039
(0.00025)

0.00043
(0.00029)

0.00038*
(0.00022)

0.00001
(0.00025)

-0.00013
(0.00017)

0.02639**
(0.01181)

-0.02441
(0.02544)

-0.01579
(0.01568)

0.04047***
(0.01437)

0.04048***
(0.01486)

0.00043*
(0.00025)

0.00094*
(0.00054)

0.00089**
(0.00041)

0.00079**
(0.00035)

0.00071**
(0.00034)

Y
114897
0.396

Y
636312
0.367

Y
822145
0.395

Y
847385
0.388

Covariates
Y
Observations
108228
R-squared
0.374
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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B. Verdugo-Verdugo Mismatch
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999)
1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

0.00139
(0.00147)

0.00136
(0.00192)

0.00186
(0.00137)

0.00527**
(0.00207)

0.00257
(0.00158)

0.01104
(0.03427)

-0.14526**
(0.06353)

-0.10890***
(0.02821)

-0.19196***
(0.02540)

-0.16617***
(0.02959)

-0.00078
(0.00072)

0.00282**
(0.00128)

0.00212***
(0.00066)

0.00316***
(0.00062)

0.00225***
(0.00060)

-0.17183**
(0.07753)

-0.14712*
(0.07449)

-0.07905*
(0.04116)

0.01941
(0.04016)

0.09164***
(0.02745)

0.00285*
(0.00168)

0.00272*
(0.00156)

0.00133
(0.00096)

0.00041
(0.00093)

-0.00045
(0.00060)

Observations

Y
108228

Y
114897

Y
636312

Y
822145

Y
847385

R-squared

0.361

0.390

0.364

0.389

0.378

Segregation Index

Over education
Segregation* Over education

Under education

Segregation* Under education

Covariates

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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Table 9 is the regression result of wage effects of industry-occupational segregation by
regression specification (3), which is a full specification, including segregation index,
covariates, mismatch measures, and interaction term between mismatch and segregation
index. The purpose of interaction term is purpose to see the wage effects of mismatch in
relation with segregation. Table A is with Duncan-Hoffman mismatch, and Table B is
with Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch.
Marginal effect of segregation from Duncan-Hoffman Mismatch for 2000 is
expressed as follows with coefficients from Table A.
𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
= −𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟕 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟖𝟗(𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
− 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟑(𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+ 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟕𝟏(𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
With the mean value of years of overeducation, years of undereducation, and years of
required education from the summary statistics table, marginal effect of segregation is
calculated as follows
𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= −𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟕 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟖𝟗(𝟎. 𝟓𝟗) − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟑(−𝟎. 𝟓𝟖) + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟕𝟏(𝟏𝟑. 𝟑𝟖)
𝝏 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
= 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟑𝟏 > 𝟎

I can see the positive effect of segregation and it can be interpreted as a partial elasticity.
Weekly wage will increase 0.31% to one unit increase in segregation index at the mean.
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The wage effects of years of overeducation, years of undereducation, and years of
required education in the relation with segregation for 2000 can be calculated as follows,
respectively
𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= −𝟎. 𝟎𝟐𝟔𝟓𝟒 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟖𝟗(𝒔𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
𝝏 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= −𝟎. 𝟎𝟐𝟑𝟐𝟑 − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟑(𝒔𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
𝝏 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= 𝟎. 𝟎𝟒𝟎𝟒𝟖 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟕𝟏(𝒔𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
𝝏 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏

It tells us that first, returns to years of education is higher for those who have required
education and followed by for those who have overeducation. The second finding is that
returns to additional years of overeducation beyond (below) the required education are
decreasing but such wage penalty becomes smaller (larger) in the state where industryoccupations are more separated between the skilled and the unskilled. In other words,
wage penalty related with overeducation is substantially higher but it becomes smaller in
the states where industry-occupations are more separated between the skilled and the
unskilled. As Acemoglu’s theory predicts, skilled workers earn more and unskilled
workers earn less in the separating equilibrium because overeducation is a matter to the
skilled workers generally.

Marginal effects of segregation from Verdugo-Verdugo Mismatch for 2000 is as
follows:
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𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟓𝟕 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟐𝟓(𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟒𝟓(𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
𝝏 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏

Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch is dummy variable with using required education as a
reference category. Therefore, in the above marginal effects of segregation,
overeducation and undereducation cannot be equal to 1 at the same time. Marginal effects
of segregation is 0.00482 if overeducation=1, while it is 0.00212 if undereducation=1. In
either case, marginal effects of segregation are positive.
The wage effects of overeducation and undereducation in the relation with
segregation for 2000 can be calculated as follows, respectively.
𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= −𝟎. 𝟏𝟔𝟔𝟏𝟕 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟐𝟓(𝒔𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏), 𝒊𝒇 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 𝟏
𝝏 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= 𝟎. 𝟎𝟗𝟏𝟔𝟒 − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟒𝟓(𝒔𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏), 𝒊𝒇 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 𝟏
𝝏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏

The wage effects of overeducation (undereducation) reveal that workers who are
overeducated (undereducated) obtain less (more) than workers who have required
education, but such wage penalty (wage premium) becomes smaller in the states where
industry-occupations are more separated between the skilled and the unskilled (second
term of right hand side). Therefore, skilled workers earn more and unskilled workers earn
less in the separating equilibrium.
In summary, three regression specifications examine the wage effects of industryoccupational segregation and the wage effects of mismatch, and wage effects of
mismatch in the relation with industry-occupational segregation. The first finding is that
wage effects of industry-occupational segregation are positive. The second finding is that
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the wage penalty related with overeducation is substantially high for all study periods. In
fact, the pattern of wage penalty has been increased over time. The third finding is that
the wage penalty from overeducation becomes smaller in states where industryoccupations are more separated between skilled and unskilled workers. The fourth
finding that differs from those of previous studies is about wage effects of mismatch in
the relation with segregation because previous studies did not consider that the labor
market can transform from a pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium, and
accordingly, the wage penalty from overeducation also can be different in the pooling
equilibrium and in the separating equilibrium.
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Table 10. Alternative Specification for Wage Effects of Industry-Occupational Segregation.
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999)
Duncan-Hoffman Mismatch
1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

0.00103
(0.00153)

0.00086
(0.00198)

0.00129
(0.00133)

0.00431*
(0.00221)

0.00199
(0.00169)

0.06623
(0.04376)

-0.06645
(0.06703)

-0.09081***
(0.02854)

-0.23519***
(0.02683)

-0.23016***
(0.01784)

-0.00080
(0.00092)

0.00250*
(0.00138)

0.00188***
(0.00064)

0.00330***
(0.00068)

0.00192***
(0.00039)

Under education

-0.03630
(0.05028)

-0.01683
(0.06392)

-0.11114***
(0.03157)

-0.05449*
(0.02926)

-0.01858
(0.02033)

Segregation*Under education

0.00175
(0.00104)

0.00158
(0.00122)

0.00175**
(0.00075)

0.00171**
(0.00070)

0.00093**
(0.00044)

Covariates
Observations

Y
108228

Y
114897

Y
636312

Y
822145

Y
847385

R-squared

0.361

0.391

0.364

0.390

0.383

Segregation Index

Over education
Segregation*Over education

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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In Table 10, both overeducation and undereducation are simple dummy variables from
Duncan-Hoffman mismatch, instead of measuring how many additional years of
education are overeducated or undereducated than the required education. If workers’
educational attainments are higher (lower) than the mode year of education in occupation,
they are classified to overeducation (undereducation).
Marginal effects of segregation for 2000 is expressed as follow
𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟗𝟗 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟗𝟐(𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟗𝟑(𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
𝝏 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏

Required education is a reference category. Therefore, in the above marginal effects of
segregation, overeducation and undereducation cannot be equal to 1 at the same time.
Either of case, however, marginal effects of segregation is positive.
The wage effects of overeducation and undereducation in the relation with
segregation for 2000 can be calculated as follows, respectively:
𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= −𝟎. 𝟐𝟑𝟎𝟏𝟔 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟗𝟐(𝒔𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏), 𝒊𝒇 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 𝟏
𝝏 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= −𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝟖𝟓𝟖 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟗𝟑(𝒔𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏), 𝒊𝒇 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 𝟏
𝝏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏

Wage penalty for both overeducation and undereducation is substantially large but
it becomes smaller in states where industry-occupations are more separated between
skilled and unskilled workers. I can find the same results that marginal effects of
segregation is positive and wage penalty related with overeducation becomes smaller in
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the states where industry-occupations are more separated between skilled and unskilled
workers.

3-2. College Wage Premiums

This section examines changes in the college wage premium over time, using five
educational categories and use high school graduates as a reference category. Following
is the regression specification.

𝒍𝒏(𝑾𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= 𝜶𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏 (𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒊 )
+ 𝜷𝟐 (𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+ 𝜷3 (𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆 ∗ 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+ 𝜷𝟒 (𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜷5 (𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜱𝒊 𝜡𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
𝑯𝒚𝒑𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒔: 𝜷𝟑 > 𝟎
Relative college wage premiums are higher in states where industry-occupations
are more separated between skilled and unskilled workers as Acemoglu’s theory predicts.
Marginal effects of college in the relation with segregation are measured by the partial
derivative as follows:
𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= 𝜷𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
𝝏 𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆
Regressions were run with three different specifications for only male samples.
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Specification (1):
𝒍𝒏(𝑾𝒂𝒈𝒆) = 𝜶𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏 (𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒊 ) + 𝜱𝒊 𝜡𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
Specification (1) includes educational dummies and covariates.
Specification (2):
𝒍𝒏(𝑾𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= 𝜶𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏 (𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒊 )
+ 𝜷𝟐 (𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+ 𝜷𝟑 (𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜷𝟒 (𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜱𝒊 𝜡𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊

Specification (2) includes educational dummies, industry-occupational
segregation index, mismatch variables, and covariates.
Specification (3):
𝒍𝒏(𝑾𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= 𝜶𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏 (𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒊 )
+ 𝜷𝟐 (𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+ 𝜷𝟑 (𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆 ∗ 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜷𝟒 (𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+ 𝜷𝟓 (𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜱𝒊 𝜡𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊

Specification (3) is a full specification which includes educational dummies,
industry-occupational segregation index, mismatch variables, interaction term between
college and segregation index, and covariates. The purpose of the interaction term is to
see college wage premiums in the relation with industry-occupational segregation.
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Table 11. Specification (1) for College Wage Premiums

Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999)
1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

College

0.27396***
(0.01053)

0.32963***
(0.01313)

0.28433***
(0.00761)

0.40537***
(0.00767)

0.38542***
(0.00765)

Less than High School

-0.13525***
(0.00831)

-0.17021***
(0.00760)

-0.14393***
(0.00637)

-0.17838***
(0.00743)

-0.15442***
(0.00455)

Some College

0.09613***
(0.00585)

0.07319***
(0.00698)

0.09247***
(0.00388)

0.13699***
(0.00534)

0.12345***
(0.00328)

Over College

0.28697***
(0.01229)

0.40125***
(0.02302)

0.38781***
(0.01227)

0.56637***
(0.00924)

0.53022***
(0.00833)

Segregation Index

N

N

N

N

N

Mismatch Variables

N

N

N

N

N

Covariates

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Observations

108228

117081

636312

822145

847385

R-squared

0.360

0.333

0.363

0.385

0.376

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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Table 11 shows the regression results for college wage premiums by regression
specification (1), which includes covariates. The purpose of the specification (1) is to
isolate wage effects of college education from wage effects of job mismatch. Relative to
high school graduates, wage rate for college graduates shows variations over time. It
might reflect changes in the supply of and demand for college graduates. For 1990,
weekly college wage is about 50% ({exp(0.40537)-1}*100=49.99) higher than high
school graduates. Overall, college wage premiums are higher in 2000, 1990 than other
periods.
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Table 12. Specification (2) for College Wage Premiums
A. Duncan-Hoffman Mismatch
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999)
1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

0.11343***
(0.01047)

0.16949***
(0.01425)

0.19401***
(0.00692)

0.27838***
(0.00872)

0.27785***
(0.00893)

Less than High School

-0.02050***
(0.00446)

-0.07323***
(0.00547)

-0.07158***
(0.00378)

-0.10516***
(0.00613)

-0.08793***
(0.00489)

Some College

0.03007***
(0.00381)

0.00624
(0.00667)

0.05490***
(0.00342)

0.09952***
(0.00520)

0.10343***
(0.00340)

Over College

0.00784
(0.01160)

0.13766***
(0.02479)

0.25331***
(0.00932)

0.36210***
(0.01167)

0.35866***
(0.01082)

Segregation Index

0.00158
(0.00140)

0.00213
(0.00180)

0.00228
(0.00140)

0.00574***
(0.00206)

0.00574***
(0.00206)

Mismatch Variables

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Covariates

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Observations

108228

117081

636312

822145

847385

R-squared

0.373

0.340

0.366

0.395

0.388

College

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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B. Verdugo-Verdugo Mismatch
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999)
1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

0.28615***
(0.01059)

0.32971***
(0.01410)

0.29272***
(0.00854)

0.44720***
(0.00768)

0.44156***
(0.01092)

Less than High School

-0.13468***
(0.00638)

-0.16101***
(0.00595)

-0.13451***
(0.00544)

-0.20140***
(0.00568)

-0.19904***
(0.00511)

Some College

0.09894***
(0.00531)

0.07354***
(0.00725)

0.09623***
(0.00389)

0.14701***
(0.00550)

0.13994***
(0.00340)

Over College

0.30082***
(0.01107)

0.40221***
(0.02462)

0.40278***
(0.01470)

0.63034***
(0.01150)

0.61282***
(0.01368)

Segregation Index

0.00165
(0.00150)

0.00224
(0.00184)

0.00230
(0.00141)

0.00576***
(0.00206)

0.00285*
(0.00164)

Mismatch Variables

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Covariates

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Observations

108228

117081

636312

822145

847385

R-squared

0.361

0.334

0.364

0.389

0.378

College

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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Table 12 shows the regression results for college wage premiums by regression
specification (2), which includes covariates, industry-occupational segregation index, and
mismatch variables. Table A is regression with Duncan-Hoffman mismatch, while Table
B is regression with Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch.
In Table A with Duncan-Hoffman mismatch, coefficients of college are much
smaller than in the Table 11, which has with no mismatch. Coefficients of college have
been increased with Duncan-Hoffman mismatch. In other words, relative college wage
premiums have been increased.
In Table B with Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch, coefficients of college are much
larger than in the Table 11, which has no mismatch. Coefficients of college have been
varied very much over time. No constant pattern can be found.
Overall, college wage premiums are affected with or without mismatch variables,
reflecting overeducation is mostly a matter for college graduates.
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Table 13. Specification (3) for College Wage Premiums
A. Duncan-Hoffman Mismatch
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999)
1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

0.10632
(0.07040)

0.07820
(0.09763)

0.11913**
(0.04507)

0.15725***
(0.04031)

0.17345***
(0.05549)

College*Segregation

0.00015
(0.00139)

0.00187
(0.00207)

0.00176
(0.00108)

0.00284***
(0.00095)

0.00234*
(0.00129)

Less than High School

-0.02049***
(0.00445)

-0.07318***
(0.00546)

-0.07165***
(0.00378)

-0.10528***
(0.00611)

-0.08809***
(0.00487)

Some College

0.03006***
(0.00382)

0.00608
(0.00659)

0.05458***
(0.00342)

0.09938***
(0.00516)

0.10327***
(0.00342)

Over College

0.00779
(0.01181)

0.13728***
(0.02461)

0.25262***
(0.00926)

0.36177***
(0.01164)

0.35852***
(0.01080)

Segregation Index

0.00157
(0.00140)

0.00199
(0.00179)

0.00207
(0.00137)

0.00528**
(0.00204)

0.00241
(0.00153)

Mismatch Variables

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Covariates

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Observations

108228

117081

636312

822145

847385

R-squared

0.373

0.340

0.366

0.395

0.388

College

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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B. Verdugo-Verdugo Mismatch
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999)
1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

College

0.30712***
(0.07098)

0.25964***
(0.09417)

0.22362***
(0.04402)

0.33174***
(0.04100)

0.32825***
(0.05625)

College*Segregation

-0.00044
(0.00147)

0.00144
(0.00203)

0.00164
(0.00109)

0.00271***
(0.00098)

0.00254*
(0.00138)

-0.13469***
(0.00637)

-0.16100***
(0.00595)

-0.13457***
(0.00545)

-0.20151***
(0.00566)

-0.19918***
(0.00511)

Some College

0.09894***
(0.00532)

0.07354***
(0.00722)

0.09619***
(0.00387)

0.14698***
(0.00544)

0.13987***
(0.00342)

Over College

0.30087***
(0.01107)

0.40233***
(0.02469)

0.40285***
(0.01471)

0.63017***
(0.01146)

0.61275***
(0.01367)

Segregation Index

0.00168
(0.00150)

0.00213
(0.00182)

0.00210
(0.00138)

0.0532**
(0.00204)

0.00241
(0.00152)

Mismatch Variables

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Covariates

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Observations

108228

117081

636312

822145

847385

R-squared

0.361

0.334

0.364

0.389

0.378

Less than High School

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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Table 13 shows the regression results for college wage premiums by regression
specification (3), which is a full specification. Table A is regression with DuncanHoffman mismatch, while Table B is regression with Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch.
Wage effects of college education are measured as follows for 2000 with DuncanHoffman mismatch and Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch, respectively:
𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= 𝟎. 𝟏𝟕𝟑𝟒𝟓 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟑𝟒(𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
𝝏 𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆
𝝏 𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= 𝟎. 𝟑𝟐𝟖𝟐𝟓 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟓𝟒(𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
𝝏 𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆
With controlling Duncan-Hoffman mismatch, the coefficient of college is much smaller
than the coefficient of controlling Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch, but the magnitudes of
coefficient of interaction term are almost the same. The coefficient of interaction term tells
us that college wage premiums increase in the states where industry-occupations are more
separated between the skilled and the unskilled. In other words, skilled workers earn more
wages in the separating equilibrium than in the pooling equilibrium.
In summary, relative to high school graduates, college wage premiums have
fluctuated over time, reflecting changes in the supply of and demand for college
graduates in the labor markets. The interaction term between the college dummy variable
and segregation index reveals that college graduates earn more in states where industryoccupations are more separated between skilled and unskilled workers. In other words,
skilled workers earn more wages in the separating equilibrium than in the pooling
equilibrium.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION

This paper began with analyzing a cause and effect relationship between the
Soviet launch of Sputnik and educational reform in the early 1960s in the United States.
During the Cold War, the Soviet launching of Sputnik poured fuel onto an existing arms
race between the Soviets and America. The American public and government perceived
Sputnik to be more a military threat than a simple product of science education. President
Eisenhower, however, found that they had a shortfall in scientists and had a lack of
science education to compete with USSR. Therefore, educational reform was arose
immediately. First, the American government extended the role of the existing National
Science Foundation in science education and production of science elites. Second,
Eisenhower signed into law the National Defense of Education Act on September 2,
1958, which was less than a year after the launching of Sputnik 1. Congress authorized
budgets for NSF and NDEA to produce science and defense related human capitals. The
NDEA poured $887 million over four years into programs intended to develop talented
people in America in fields related with national defense by providing scholarships to
students. During the Eisenhower administration, the goal of federal funding was
producing scientists and engineers for the national security.
After Eisenhower, Kennedy became the President. His domestic agendas, under
the name of the New Frontier, were racial integration, equality of the sex in the work
place, civil rights of African American, and extending equal opportunity of access to
higher education by minority races. After Kennedy’s assassination, Lyndon Johnson
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became the President. Johnson was interested in civil rights, eliminating poverty, and
racial injustice under his domestic program, Great Society. The Higher Education Act
was signed into law in 1965, and was one of the fruits of Great Society. Sputnik-triggered
educational reform was transformed from science and defense education to production of
more general human capitals for economic growth.
From the NSF, NDEA to HEA, the federal goal of educational reform was
diffused from science and defense education to all levels of education to provide
Americans more educational opportunities and to produce general human capitals for
economic growth. By combining three policy outputs, NSF, NDEA, HEA, and the
increase in college enrollments as a policy outcome, empirical study analyzed wage
effects of increase in the supply of college graduates by applying Acemoglu’s theory, the
pooling equilibrium and the separating equilibrium. In applying Acemoglu’s theory, I
calculated industry-occupational segregation index by using Duncan segregation index
for the contiguous 48 states over the years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 using
decennial census data from IPUMS-USA.
Empirical study found first that, as the portion of population educated with
college or higher increases, industry-occupational segregation increases, which is
consistent with Acemoglu’s theory that as skilled workers are abundant, the economy
transforms from the pooling equilibrium to the separating equilibrium. The second
finding is that incidence of overeducation, measured by Duncan-Hoffman mismatch,
decreases as segregation index increases. In other words, the probability of being
overeducated becomes lower in states where industry-occupations are more separated
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between skilled and unskilled workers. The third finding is that wage effects of
segregation are positive and largest in 1990. In other words, mean wage is higher in states
where industry-occupations are more separated between skilled and unskilled workers.
The fourth finding is that marginal effect of segregation, including interaction term
between segregation and mismatch variables, on wage is positive with Duncan-Hoffman
mismatch. The fifth finding is that returns to additional years of overeducation beyond
the required education are decreasing but such wage penalty becomes smaller in the
states where industry-occupations are more separated between the skilled and the
unskilled. In other words, wage penalty related with overeducation is substantially higher
but it becomes smaller in the separating equilibrium. Analyzing wage effects of
overeducation in the relation with the pooling and separating equilibria is a different
approach from previous literatures.
Moreover, college wage premium in the relation with the pooling and separating
equilibria shows that, relative to high school graduates, college graduates earn more
wages in states where industry-occupations are more separated between the skilled and
the unskilled.
In summary, this paper insists that educational reform in the early 1960s did not
arise by domestic needs but it was triggered by an exogenous event: the Soviet launching
of Sputnik. The Sputnik-triggered educational reform contributed increases in college
enrollments and thereby increases in the supply of college graduates over time. Policy
process reveals how reactions of the American public, media, politicians, national mood,
and President attributed to educational reform. As unintended consequences, tuition and
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fees of college education have soared up, corresponding to the increase in demand for
college education. Another unintended consequence is the involvement of the federal
government in education. The role of federal government in the educational reform did
not stop with NDEA 1958, but was much extended under President Kennedy’s New
Frontier and President Johnson’s Great Society. By applying Acemoglu’s theory in
empirical study, I can partially confirm that labor markets at the state level have
transformed from the pooling equilibrium to the separating equilibrium since 1960 to
2000. In such a transition, skilled workers obtain more wages than unskilled workers in
the states where industry-occupations are more separated between the skilled and the
unskilled. Related with overeducation, wage penalty is substantially higher but it
becomes smaller in the states where industry-occupations are more separated between the
skilled and the unskilled. In other words, as the economy transforms to the separating
equilibrium, wage inequality between the skilled and the unskilled becomes wider and
wage penalty from overeducation (a matter exclusive to the skilled workers) becomes
smaller.

119

REFERENCES
Acemoglu, Daron, “Changes in Unemployment and Wage Inequality: An Alternative
Theory and Some Evidence”, American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 5, (Dec.,
1999), pp. 1259-1278.
Alba-Ramirez, Alfonso, “Mismatch in the Spanish Labor Market: Overeducation?”
Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 259-278.
Autor, H. David, Lawrence F. Katz, Alan B. Krueger, “Computing Inequality: Have
Computers Changed the Labor Market?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
113, No. 4 (Nov., 1998), pp. 1169-1213.
Bardach Eugene, “A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis”, Chatham House Publishers,
2000.
Battu, H., C.R. Belfield, P.J. Sloane, “How Well Can We Measure Graduate
Overeducation and Its Effects?” National Institute Economic Review, No. 17,
(Jan., 2000).
Baumgartner, R. Frank, D. Bryan Jones, “Agendas and Instability in American Politics”,
University of Chicago Press, 2009.
Bauer, K. Thomas, “Educational Mismatch and Wages: A Panel Analysis”, Economics of
Education Review, 21, 2002, pp. 221-229.
Becker, S. Gary, “Human Capital”, University of Chicago Press, 1993.
Berman, Eli, John Bound, Zvi Griliches, “Changes in the Demand for Skilled Labor
within U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the Annual Survey of

120

Manufacturers”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 2, (May, 1994),
pp. 367-397.
Birkland, A. Thomas, “An Introduction to the Policy Process”, M. E. Sharpe, 2001.
Bound, John, George Johnson, “Changes in the Structure of Wages in the 1980’s: An
Evaluation of Alternative Explanations”, American Economic Review, Vol. 82,
No. 3 (Jun., 1992), pp. 371-392.
Brainard, Jeffrey, “50 Years After Sputnik, America Sees Itself in Another Science
Race”, Chronicle of Higher Education, October 4th, 2007.
Brams, J. Steven, D. Morton Davis, D. Philip Straffin Jr. “The Geometry of the Arms
Race”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Dec., 1979), pp. 567588.
Buchel, Felix, “The Effects of Overeducation on Productivity in Germany – The Firms
Viewpoint”, IZA Discussion Paper Series, No. 216, 2000.
Card, David, E. John DiNardo, “Skill-Biased Technological Change and Rising Wage
Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles”, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 20,
No. 4, Oct 2002.
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, “Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote Arms
Races?” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 2007.
Cook, E. Timothy, “Governing With the News”, University of Chicago Press, 2005.
Daly, C. Mary, Felix Buchel, J. Greg Duncan, “Premiums and Penalties for Surplus and
Deficit Education Evidence from the United States and Germany”, Economics of
Education Review, 19, 2000, pp. 169-178.

121

Degroot, J. Gerard, “Dark Side of The Moon”, New York University Press, 2006
Duncan, Greg J., and Saul D. Hoffman, “The Incidence and Wage Effects of
Overeducation”, Economics of Education Review, Vol. 1, Issue 1, (Winter,
1981), pp. 75-86.
Dworkin, Gerald, “Paternalism”, Monist, Vol. 56, No. 1, Philosophy and Public Policy
(Jan., 1972), pp. 64-84.
Finkin, W. Matthew, “The Unfolding Tendency in the Federal Relationship to Private
Accreditation in Higher Education”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 57,
No. 4 (Autumn, 1994).
Fleischacker, Samuel, “A Short History of Distributive Justice”, Harvard University
Press, 2004
Freeman, B. Richard, “Overinvestment in College Training?” Journal of Human
Resources, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Summer, 1975), pp. 287-311.
Freeman, B. Richard, “The Overeducated American”, Academic Press, 1976.
Gilbert K. Claire, E. Donald Heller, “Access, Equity, and Community Colleges: The
Truman Commission and Federal Higher Education Policy from 1947 to 2011”,
Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 84, No. 3, (May/June, 2013), pp. 417-443.
Hannah, B. Susan, “The Higher Education Act of 1992: Skills, Constraints, and the
Politics of Higher Education”, Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 67, No. 5
(Sep. – Oct., 1996), pp. 498-527.
Hartog, Joop, “Over-education and Earnings: Where are We, Where Should We go?”
Economics of Education Review, 19, 2000, pp. 131-147.

122

Hartog, Joop, T. Pedro Pereira, A. C. Jose Vieira, “Changing Returns to Education in
Portugal during the 1980s and early 1990s: OLS and Quantile Regression
Estimators”, Applied Economics, 2001, 33, pp. 1021-1037.
Hersch, Joni, “Education Match and Job Match”, Review of Economics and Statistics,
Vol. 73, No. 1 (Feb., 1991), pp. 140-144.
Isbister, John, “Capitalism and Justice”, Kumarian Press, 2001.
John, W. Kingdon, “Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies”, Addison-Wesley
Educational Publishers, 2003.
Johnson, E. George, “Subsidies for Higher Education”, Journal of Labor Economics,
Vol. 2, No. 3 (Jul., 1984), pp. 303-318.
Jovanovic, Boyan, “Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover”, Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 87, No. 5, Part 1, (Oct., 1979), pp. 972-990.
Jovanovic, Boyan, “Firm-specific Capital and Turnover”, Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 87, No. 6, (Dec., 1979), pp. 1246-1260.
Katz F. Lawrence, Kevin M. Murphy, “Changes in Relative Wages, 196301987: Supply
and Demand Factors”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 1. (Feb.,
1992), pp. 35-78.
Kane, J. Thomas, “College Entry by Blacks since 1970: The Role of College Costs,
Family Background, and the Returns to Education”, Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 102, No. 5 (Oct., 1994), pp. 878-911.
Keppel, Francis, “The Higher Education Acts Contrasted, 1965-1986: Has Federal Policy
Come of Age?” Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 57, No. 1, (Feb., 1987).

123

Kiker, B. F., Santos C. Maria, Mendes de Oliveira, M. “Overeducation and
Undereducation: Evidence for Portugal”, Economics of Education Review, 16(2),
1997, pp. 111-125.
Lucena, C. Juan, “Defending the Nation”, University Press of America, 2005.
MacRae, Duncan Jr., Dale Whittington, “Expert Advice for Policy Choice”, Georgetown
University Press, 1997.
McGoldrick, KimMarie, John Robst, “Gender Differences in Overeducation: A Test of
the Theory of Differential Overqualification”, American Economic Review, Vol.
86, No. 2, (May, 1996), pp. 280-284.
McGuinness, Seamus, Doyle Jessica, “Overeducation and the Graduate Labor Market: A
Quantile Regression Approach”, Economic Research Institute of Northern
Ireland, Working Paper Series, No. 1, October 2004.
McGuire, A. Matthew, “Subprime Education: For-Profit Colleges and the Problem with
Title IV Federal Student Aid”, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 62. 2012.
Orfield, Gary, “Public Policy and College Opportunity”, American Journal of Education,
Vol. 98, No. 4, (Aug., 1990).
Ostrom, Elinor, “Governing the Commons”, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Ramos, Raul, Surinach Jordi, Artis Manuel, “Regional Economic Growth and Human
Capital: The Role of Overeducation”, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA),
Working Paper, No. 4453, (September, 2009).
Richardson, Lewis Fry “Arms and Insecurity”, Boxwood Press, 1960.

124

Robst, John, “Measurement Error and the Returns to Excess Schooling”, Applied
Economics Letters, 1994, pp. 142-144.
Robst, John, “Career Mobility, Job Match, and Overeducation”, Eastern Economic
Journal, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Fall, 1995), pp. 539-550.
Robst, John, “College Quality and Overeducation”, Economics of Education Review, Vol.
14, No. 3, pp221-228, 1995.
Rodriguez-Pose, Andres, Montserrat Vilalta-Bufi, “Education, Migration, and Job
Satisfaction: The Regional Returns of Human Capital in the EU”, Bruges
European Economic Research Papers, November, 2004.
Rumberger, W. Russel, “The Economic Decline of College Graduates: Fact or Fallacy?”
Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Winter, 1980), pp. 99-112.
Rumberger, W. Russell, “The Job Market for College Graduates, 1960-90”, Journal of
Higher Education, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Jul. – Aug., 1984), pp. 433-454.
Rumberger, W. Russell, “The Impact of Surplus Schooling on Productivity and
Earnings”, Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Winter, 1987), pp. 2450.
Sabatier, A. Paul, “Theories of the Policy Process”, Westview Press, 1999.
Sattinger, Michael, “Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings”, Journal of
Economic Literature, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1993), pp. 831-880.
Schapiro, O. Morton, McPherson S. Michael, “Does Student Aid Affect College
Enrollment? New Evidence on a Persistent Controversy”, American Economic
Review, Vol. 81, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 309-318.

125

Sicherman, Nachum, Oded Galor, “A Theory of Career Mobility”, Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 98, No. 1 (Feb., 1990), pp. 169-192.
Sicherman, Nachum, “Overeducation in the Labor Market”, Journal of Labor Economics,
Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr., 1991), pp. 101-122.
Slonimczyk, Fabian, “Earnings Inequality and Skill Mismatch in the U.S.: 1973-2002”
Journal of Economic Inequality, 2013.
Smith, L. Herbert, “Overeducation and Underemployment: An Agnostic Review”,
Sociology of Education, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Apr., 1986), pp. 85-99.
Sousa-Poza, Alfonso, Christa Frei, “Overqualification: permanent or transitory?” Applied
Economics, 2012, pp. 1837-1847.
Spence, Michael, “Job Market Signaling”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87,
Issue 3, (Aug., 1973), pp.355-374.
Thaler H. Richard, Cass R. Sunstein, “Behavioral Economics, Public Policy, and
Paternalism”, American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 2, (May, 2003), pp.
175-179.
Thomas, C. Leonard, Goldfarb S. Robert, Suranovic M. Steven, “New on Paternalism
and Public Policy”, Economic and Philosophy, 16 (2000), pp.323-331.
Thurow, C. Lester, “Generating Inequality”, New York: Basic Books, 1975.
Topel, H. Robert, “Factor Proportions and Relative Wages: The Supply-Side
Determinants of Wage Inequality”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11,
No. 2, (Spring, 1997), pp. 55-74.

126

Trostel, A. Philip, “Should Education be Publicly Provided?” Bulletin of Economic
Research 54:4, 2002, pp.0307-3378.
Tsang, C. Mun, Henry M. Levin, “The Economic of Overeducation”, Economics of
Education Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 93-104, 1985.
Tsang, C. Mun, “The Impact of Underutilization of Education on Productivity: A Case
Study of the U.S. Bell Companies”, Economics of Education Review, Vol. 6,
No. 3, pp. 239-254, 1987.
Tsang, C. Mun, Russell W. Rumberger, Henry M. Levin, “The Impact of Surplus
Schooling on Worker Productivity”, Industrial Relations, Vol. 30, No. 2,
(Spring, 1991).
Van Der Ploeg, F and J. A De Zeeuw, “Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Competitive
Arms Accumulation”, International Economic Review, Vol. 31, No. 1, (Feb.,
1990), pp. 131-146.
Verdugo, R. Richard, Naomi Verdugo Turner, “The Impact of Surplus Schooling on
Earnings: Some Additional Findings”, Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 24,
No. 4 (Autumn, 1989), pp. 629-643.
Wang, Zuoyue, “In Sputnik’s Shadow”, Rutgers University Press, 2008.
Whitford, B. Andrew, Jeff Yates, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda”, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2009.
Wood, B. Dan, W. Richard Waterman, “Bureaucratic Dynamics”, Westview Press, 1994.
Young, V. Tamara, V. Thomas Shepley, Mengli Song, “Understanding Agenda Setting in
State Educational Policy: An Application of Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model

127

to the Formation of State Reading Policy”, Education Policy Analysis Archives,
18(15), 2010.
Zamir, Eyal, “The Efficiency of Paternalism”, Virginia Law Review, June 2007.

128

